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Random numbers are a fundamental resource in science and engineering with impor-
tant applications in simulation and cryptography. The inherent randomness at the core
of quantum mechanics makes quantum systems a perfect source of entropy. Quantum
random number generation is one of the most mature quantum technologies with many
alternative generation methods. We discuss the different technologies in quantum ran-
dom number generation from the early devices based on radioactive decay to the multiple
ways to use the quantum states of light to gather entropy from a quantum origin. We
also discuss randomness extraction and amplification and the notable possibility of gen-
erating trusted random numbers even with untrusted hardware using device independent
generation protocols.
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2I. MOTIVATION
Quantum mechanics offers interesting new protocols in
the intersection between computer science, telecommu-
nications, information theory and physics. Results like
the protocols for quantum key distribution (Bennett and
Brassard, 1984; Ekert, 1991) and efficient algorithms for
problems that are thought or known to be hard for clas-
sical computers (Childs and van Dam, 2010; Ekert and
Jozsa, 1996) show quantum physics can have a profound
impact in the way we think about security, cryptography
and computation.
Despite the impressive experimental achievements of
the last decades, the current state of technology is still
not advanced enough for a full-scale universal quan-
tum computer. Quantum key distribution, on the other
hand, has already become an established technology and
the first commercial systems have been demonstrated in
practical scenarios (Peev et al., 2009; Sasaki et al., 2011).
Another important well-established quantum technol-
ogy is quantum random number generation. Quantum
random number generators, QRNGs, are devices that
use quantum mechanical effects to produce random num-
bers and have applications that range from simulation
to cryptography. They are usually simpler than other
quantum devices and are mature enough to be applied.
QRNGs using different quantum phenomena have gone
from the lab to the shelves with at least eight exist-
ing commercial products (ComScire, 2014; Hughes and
Nordholt, 2016; ID Quantique, 2014; MPD, 2014; Pico-
Quant, 2014; QRB121, 2014; Quintessence Labs, 2014;
Qutools, 2014) and online servers that provide quantum
random numbers on demand (ANU, 2016; Humboldt-
Universita¨t, 2016; Stevanovic´ et al., 2008; University of
Geneva, 2004; Walker, 1996), as well as many patents
(Beausoleil et al., 2008; Dultz et al., 2002; Dultz and
Hidlebrandt, 2002; Kim and Klass, 2001; Klass, 2003,
2005; Lutkenhaus et al., 2007; Ribordy et al., 2009; Sartor
and Zimmermann, 2015; Trifonov and Vig, 2007; Vartsky
et al., 2011). In the last few years there has also been
a large number of proposals, experiments, improvements
and exciting theoretical results in randomness extraction
and randomness certification.
The aim of this review is to collect the most important
proposals for quantum random number generation and
give an introduction to the new advanced protocols that
use quantum physics to process, certify or otherwise deal
with random strings. This paper complements previous
surveys on the topics of physical and quantum random
number generation (Stipcˇevic´, 2012; Stipcˇevic´ and Koc¸,
2014) with a focus on QRNGs based on quantum optics.
Section II gives a brief description of the most impor-
tant applications of randomness in science and comput-
ers. We review the differences between algorithmic meth-
ods to produce random looking numbers and physical
methods to produce true random numbers and discuss
when each method is more appropriate. Due to their im-
portance, we concentrate on applications to simulation
and cryptography.
Section III describes the main functional elements of
quantum random number generators and their roles. In
Section IV, we present some mathematical measures of
randomness which are particularly useful to analyse the
amount of available random bits and the security of quan-
tum random number generators.
Section V discusses QRNGs based on radioactive de-
cay, which were the first proposed QRNGs and are still
in use today. Section VI introduces random number gen-
erators based on electronic noise and analyses when they
can be said to be quantum.
Section VII discusses how optics has modernized
QRNGs. Most present-day QRNGs are based on quan-
tum optics and we review the multiple implementations
that work with the quantum states of light.
Section VIII covers alternative QRNGs based on non-
optical quantum phenomena and Section IX is centered
on those QRNGs whose randomness is backed by quan-
tum mechanics.
Section X gives a brief tour on the available classi-
cal randomness extraction methods and Section XI in-
troduces the quantum protocols for randomness expan-
sion and amplification that allow to produce good-quality
random outputs from weak randomness sources.
Section XII is an introduction to the statistical tests
that are usually employed to assess the quality of the
final random bit stream.
Finally, in Section XIII, we give an overview on the
current state of quantum random number generation and
the challenges and opportunities for the next generation
of quantum devices in the field of randomness.
II. RANDOM NUMBERS AND THEIR APPLICATIONS
Random numbers are an essential resource in science,
technology and many aspects of everyday life (Hayes,
2001). Randomness is required to different extents in
applications like cryptography, simulation, coordination
in computer networks or lotteries. Some applications
require a small amount of random numbers and still
use manual and mechanical methods to generate ran-
domness, like tossing a coin, throwing a die, spinning a
roulette wheel or a drawing a ball from a lottery machine.
Here, we will concern ourselves with the generation of
random numbers for computers.
Defining randomness is a deep philosophical problem
and we will not attempt to solve it here. In this Section,
we give common operational definitions of randomness
that fit the different purposes the random numbers must
fulfil. For instance, in simulation, a method that gen-
erates numbers simulating the statistics of the desired
distribution can be considered to be “random enough”,
3even if it produces a predictable sequence.
A. Pseudorandom number generators and true random
number generators
In computing, it is important to distinguish between
algorithmically generated numbers that mimic the statis-
tics of random distributions and random numbers gener-
ated from unpredictable physical events.
Generating random numbers directly from a computer
seems a particularly attractive idea. Methods that pro-
duce random numbers from a deterministic algorithm are
called pseudorandom number generators, PRNGs.
While it is clear that any algorithmically generated se-
quence cannot be truly random, for many applications
the appearance of randomness is enough1.
PRNGs normally start from a small string of bits called
the seed that is used as the input of a procedure that
outputs a long sequence of bits following the statistics
of the uniform distribution. In principle, an RNG could
produce numbers obeying any random distribution, but
the standard practice is trying to provide a uniform
distribution, from which we can obtain the most com-
monly used distributions using well-known transforma-
tions (Ho¨rmann et al., 2004). Knuth gives an excellent
survey on PRNGs and how to transform uniform ran-
dom numbers into other types of random quantities in
his second book of the series “The Art of Computing
Programming” (Knuth, 1997).
A large number of PRNGs are based on number the-
ory. Linear congruential generators have been partic-
ularly popular since Lehmer introduced them in 1951
(Lehmer, 1951). Linear congruential generators produce
random numbers from the recursive formula
Xn+1 = (aXn + c) mod m, n ≥ 0, (1)
where Xi is the ith digit in the sequence of random num-
bers, m > 0 is the modulus, 0 ≤ a < m is called the
multiplier and 0 ≤ c < m the increment. The proper-
ties of the output depend heavily on the correct choice
of these parameters. A poor choice can create an output
sequence with a short period.
Its period is one of the most important properties of
any PRNG. The next number in a pseudorandom se-
quence is determined from the internal state of generator.
For a finite memory, the internal state will at some point
be the same and the output sequence will begin to re-
peat itself. PRNGs are chosen to have a large periods so
1 The famous quote from von Neumann “Any one who considers
arithmetical methods of producing random numbers is, of course,
in a state of sin” is just a way to acknowledge this fact, but also
to admit it is an acceptable practice. In the same paper (von
Neumann, 1951) he goes on to comment on some methods to
produce pseudorandom sequences.
that the repetition does not appear during the intended
operation time.
Apart from congruential linear generators, there is an-
other large family of PRNGs based on linear shift feed-
back registers, LFSRs, and their generalizations. The
most notable generator in this class is the Mersenne
Twister (Matsumoto and Nishimura, 1998), which be-
longs to the family of twisted generalized linear shift feed-
back registers. The Mersenne Twister has a period which
is a Mersenne prime of the form 2n − 1, for an integer
n. The most widely used pseudorandom number gen-
erator is the MT19937, the standard implementation of
the Mersenne Twister with a period 219937 − 1. It is the
default generator in many programming languages and
popular scientific software.
L’Ecuyer gives a good review of these and other alter-
native PRNGs based on different principles (L’Ecuyer,
2012).
Pseudorandom numbers have certain advantages that
make them popular. They can be much faster than al-
ternative random number generation methods and their
results are reproducible. For instance, we can repeat the
exact same simulation if we know the seed. However,
for many applications, unpredictability is an important
requisite. Clearly, a predictable lottery is not accept-
able, even if all the resulting numbers are uniformly dis-
tributed. Some pseudorandom generators are designed
to be unpredictable (see Section II.C), but, applications
that need an output that cannot be guessed usually turn
to true random number generators, TRNGs, if only
to renew the seed of a PRNG.
True random number generators measure some unpre-
dictable or, at least, difficult to predict physical process
and use the results to create a sequence of random num-
bers. They either rely on unpredictable values that can
be accessed from the software inside the computer or cre-
ate the sequence in a special-purpose device that feeds it
into the operating system.
The process of collecting unpredictable data is usu-
ally called entropy gathering. Some of the standard en-
tropy sources the operating system can access include
data from the sound card, disk access times, the tim-
ing of interrupts or user interaction data, like mouse
motion or keystrokes, to name a few. The way the
Linux operating systems collect entropy and convert it
into random bits (Gutterman et al., 2006) is an illustra-
tive example of many of the most usual methods. Some
authors call these generators that use non-deterministic
events, non-physical non-deterministic RNGs (Killmann
and Schindler, 2008) that stand in contrast to physi-
cal TRNGs based in non-deterministic physical effects in
electronic circuits or in the result of some physical exper-
iment. Alternatively, there are physical TRNGs based on
different principles, such as chaotic systems (Stojanovski
and Kocarev, 2001; Stojanovski et al., 2001), thermal
noise in electronic circuits (Murry, 1970; Petrie and Con-
4nelly, 2000), free running oscillators (Kohlbrenner and
Gaj, 2004), or biometric parameters (Szczepanski et al.,
2004) as a few examples.
Some vendors include integrated physical random
number generators in their processors. Intel has in-
cluded in its recent processors a digital RNG based on a
metastable latch that, due to thermal noise, suffers jumps
in its state at around a 3 GHz rate. This integrated RNG
can be directly accessed from a processor instruction,
RdRand, (Hamburg et al., 2012; Taylor and Cox, 2011).
Similarly, the VIA Technologies Nehemiah processor core
includes an on-chip random number generator which is
based on a series of oscillators where thermal noise al-
ters the jitter so that the combination of the oscillators’
output is random (Cryptography Research Inc., 2003).
These integrated RNG include conditioning circuits that
process the output to remove biases.
With an integrated physical random number genera-
tor there is always an available source of entropy and we
are not limited to resort to other sources of randomness
that might not provide fresh entropy in a reliable and
steady fashion. For instance, many servers are connected
to a limited number of peripherals and do not have ac-
cess to many random events like mouse motions. These
servers can only gather entropy slowly and under severe
constraints.
An integrated physical generator is a convenient ad-
dition, but it can also be complemented with the use of
external RNGs. This can be a good solution if we do not
trust the mechanism in the implementation, the vendor
has not released it, or we suspect the chip might have a
backdoor either by design or by sabotage (Becker et al.,
2014).
Quantum random number generators are a particular
case of physical TRNGs in which the data is the result of
a quantum event. As opposed to other physical systems
where uncertainty is a result of an incomplete knowledge
of the system, true randomness is an essential part of
quantum mechanics as we know it.
On first sight, physical RNGs seem more desirable
that deterministic methods. However, there are incon-
veniences that have impeded their wider adoption. Some
of the problems in physical RNGs are
1. Limited generation rate. Physical RNG usually
produce random numbers at a much smaller rate
than software methods. In many cases, there is a
fundamental limitation in the rate of change of the
sampled physical parameter. If the system is sam-
pled at a high rate, there is not enough time for the
system to change and the random numbers are not
independent.
2. It is difficult to give a convincing argument for the
randomness of the data. There can be reasonable
doubts about the randomness of the chosen phys-
ical phenomenon. Many physical random number
generators rely on our ignorance to describe a phys-
ical process rather than in its intrinsic randomness.
3. Adding an external device is usually inconvenient.
4. Failures are difficult to detect. If a hardware ran-
dom number generator fails during operation, it
can be difficult to notice. Official recommendations
suggest introducing a startup test, a total failure
test and an online test to check errors during oper-
ation (Killmann and Schindler, 2011; Schindler and
Killmann, 2003).
The advanced Quantum Random Number Generators
that have appeared with the impulse of quantum infor-
mation research try to solve some of these shortcomings
of traditional TRNGs. They offer a solution based on a
trusted randomness source and many from the different
implementations achieve fast generation rates, normally
above the megabit per second, as we will see in the mul-
tiple optical implementations described in Section VII.
This faster rate allows new applications for TRNGs, such
as online casinos and Internet gambling, which require
a constant stream of random data and cannot use the
slower methods of traditional daily or weekly lotteries
(ID Quantique, 2011; PokerStars, 2016).
An important distinction between pseudorandom num-
ber generators and physical random number generators
is the focus on product or process randomness (Calude,
2015; Eagle, 2005). For pseudorandom number genera-
tors we can only evaluate the output strings. We focus
on the product of the ultimately deterministic algorithm
and we try to determine whether the string has all the
properties of a random sequence. In order to determine
if we have product randomness our options are limited
to checking the output strings and submitting them to
certain statistical test (see Section XII).
In physical random number generators we concentrate
on process randomness. We look for a process that pro-
duces a random output and seek to obtain true random
numbers from fundamentally random physical phenom-
ena. Here, randomness is usually taken as unpredictabil-
ity.
While, properly, classical phenomena can not be con-
sidered truly random, in common use, the terms phys-
ical and true random number generator are used inter-
changeably. Usually, it is fine to use an unpredictable
physical system as a randomness source. However, there
remains a doubt whether the backing physical process is
truly random or, at least, presents serious difficulties to
be predicted, like a chaotic system, or we simply have a
poor model and a better one could destroy the illusion
of randomness. Quantum random number generators ex-
cel in that aspect: they use very well defined inherently
random processes as the source of their bits.
In the rest of this Section we will consider in some de-
tail how algorithmic and physical random number gener-
5ation methods are employed in two of the most important
families of applications for RNGs, simulation and cryp-
tography. We go through the particular requirements of
randomness of each application and discuss the RNGs
that are currently used in each case and the dangers of
choosing a wrong randomness generation method. We
then write about random number generation in funda-
mental science experiments.
B. Random numbers in simulation
Random numbers play an essential role in many sci-
entific fields. They are fundamental ingredients in ran-
domized algorithms, which have a wide range of applica-
tions in simulation, computing, number theory and other
branches of science and engineering (Karp, 1991; Mot-
wani and Raghavan, 1996).
Simplified models of the reality are indispensable tools
when we want to predict the behaviour of complex sys-
tems that cannot be accurately described with a closed
formula or when the computational needs for a full nu-
merical analysis are too high. These models turn to
random numbers to incorporate the combined effect of
all that is left out. Thus, random number generation is
needed in simulations in engineering, network, manufac-
turing, business and computer science problems (Bratley
et al., 1987; Fishman, 1978; Law and Kelton, 2000). The
usual hypothesis is that we can obtain accurate results
if we study enough cases chosen uniformly at random.
These results, while probabilistic, are usually represen-
tative. We need, nevertheless, good random numbers.
For instance, in the social sciences it is crucial to have a
sound random sampling method to be confident that the
study group is a faithful proxy for the whole population
that we want to describe (Lohr, 2010).
A particularly important area is Monte Carlo and
Quasi-Monte Carlo methods (Gentle, 2009; Metropolis
and Ulam, 1949; Niederreiter, 1978) in which we can find
the solution to a complex problem by averaging many
random instances. These methods are very effective in
solving problems in statistical physics and numerical in-
tegration, where they are extensively used. If we sample
the state space really at random, the result is likely to be
correct, but, due to the high volume of data they require,
these algorithms usually get their random numbers from
a PRNG. When correctly done, this is enough. In simu-
lation we only need a generator following the right statis-
tics. However, certain generators that seem reliable un-
der the usual tests (see Section XII) have undetected long
range correlations that can result in a wrong solution.
This is a general problem for congruential generators. In
“Random numbers fall mainly in the planes” (Marsaglia,
1968) Marsaglia showed that, choosing the right coordi-
nates, consecutive random numbers from multiplicative
congruential generators cluster into clear patterns. There
are ways to correct this bias (Bauke and Mertens, 2007),
but there exist many examples of simulations using faulty
PRNG that gave results that, when compared to a known
solution, were proved to be wrong, while a different, bet-
ter PRNG gave the correct answer. There are numerous
recorded cases of such failures for the Ising model (Fer-
renberg et al., 1992; Hoogland et al., 1985; Kalle and
Wansleben, 1984; Milchev et al., 1986; Ossola and Sokal,
2004; Parisi and Rapuano, 1985; Schmid and Wilding,
1995) and related problems (Grassberger, 1993; Hongo
et al., 2010; Shchur et al., 1997; Ziff, 1998). Choosing a
bad seed during initialization can also result in a corre-
lated output (Matsumoto et al., 2007).
Because of these issues, there are authors that have
proposed to test PRNGs with the practical problems they
are going to solve in addition to the standard statistical
tests (Coddington, 1994, 1996; Vattulainen et al., 1994,
1995). For Monte Carlo methods it is also a generally
good idea contrasting the results of the same algorithm
with different PRNGs, which are unlikely to have the
same kind of bias.
True RNG are seldom used for simulation apart from
seeding the PRNG. They face several challenges. They
are slow when compared to the fastest PRNGs and their
results are not easy to reproduce. This is a problem dur-
ing debugging and replication. The only way to repeat
the results of a TRNG is storing the sequence, which can
be extremely large for a Monte Carlo run. They also need
a fast method to interface with the processor. Anyway,
true random number generators are adequate for simu-
lation. While the generation rates of present Quantum
RNGs are still a few orders of magnitude below those
of good quality PRNGs, they are growing and QRNGs
have shown they can be used, at a speed disadvantage,
in Monte Carlo simulation (Preez et al., 2011). Improve-
ments in the generation speed could make them a viable
alternative in certain applications.
C. Random numbers in cryptography
Randomness is also a basic cryptographic primitive.
Most of modern cryptography follows Kerckhoffs’s prin-
ciple (Kerckhoffs, 1883) and assumes any cryptographic
system can fall into the hands of the adversary and that
all the details of the system are perfectly known. Cryp-
tographic system are therefore open and all the security
rests in the choice of a secret key. That way, if a channel
is compromised, the users just need to change that key.
This has many advantages and is generally considered
good practice.
In that context, it is of the utmost importance to
choose a random key, which usually means choosing an
n-bit string uniformly at random from all the key space.
Similarly, random numbers with sometimes more relaxed
randomness requisites are needed in other cryptographic
6protocols (Gennaro, 2006). Random numbers are re-
quired in nonces (numbers that must be used only once),
in initialization vectors, in sequence numbers (Network-
ing Working Group, 1996), in salt2 to avoid dictionary
attacks in hashed password lists and in digital signatures,
as well as in many interactive protocols (Goldreich, 1999).
Quantum cryptography also needs a reliable random-
ness source. Quantum key distribution is open to attacks
if the measurement bases and the states are not chosen
in a truly random way, as has been shown for the BB84
protocol (Bouda et al., 2012; Li et al., 2015).
In cryptography it is not enough that the random num-
bers are uniform. They must also be unpredictable and
the generator should limit the damage of any compro-
mised key. There are, depending on authors, at least
two new conditions for random numbers to be used in
cryptography:
1. Unpredictability (forward security): an attacker
that knows the whole sequence cannot guess the
next bit with a probability better than one half.
2. Backward security: knowledge of a part of the se-
quence shall not permit an attacker to compute the
previous values of the generator with better accu-
racy than guessing.
For practical purposes, both requisites of unpredictabil-
ity can be reduced to polynomial-time unpredictability:
that no algorithm can take a subsequence from the gen-
erator and guess efficiently (in polynomial time) any pre-
vious or following subsequences with better results than
total random guessing. This concept is based on Yao’s
definition of indistinguishable sources (Yao, 1982).
Most PRNG are not up to the task of generating cryp-
tographically secure random numbers. For instance, the
internal state in the Mersenne Twister can be deduced
from a long enough output sequence (Matsumoto and
Nishimura, 1998) and the output of a large type of general
congruential generators can be predicted without even
knowing the parameters in the generator (Krawczyk,
1990).
2 Passwords should not be stored directly as text to prevent fur-
ther damage if the password file is compromised. The common
practice is to store the cryptographic hash of the password string,
which, ideally, is a fixed-length bit string that looks random and
from which it is unfeasible to recover the original password. How-
ever, it is easy to compile a list of the most common passwords
and create a list of their hashes. This is called a dictionary at-
tack and it allows an adversary to find the original password
from the hashed password list by comparison. One way to ham-
per this attack is to include a random sequence, called salt, that
is hashed together with the password. The salt string is public,
but different for every password in the list, making dictionary at-
tacks computationally costly (precomputed universal tables are
no longer a valid shortcut).
There are however, established ways to use pseudoran-
dom number generators in cryptographic applications.
Algorithmic generators that fulfil the additional criteria
are called cryptographically secure pseudorandom num-
ber generators CSPRNGs. Two examples based on num-
ber theory are the Blum and Micali (Blum and Micali,
1984) and the Blum Blum Shub generators (Blum et al.,
1986). We can use Blum Blum Shub as an illustration.
The output bits come from the recursive formula
Xi+1 = X
2
i mod N (2)
for N = pq the product of two primes p and q congruent
to 3 mod 4. Xi is the ith number used as the internal
state. The algorithm has N and X0 as inputs and the ith
output bit is the parity ofXi (or, in some variations, a few
least significant bits). The initial state X0 should come
from a TRNG. This generator has some desirable proper-
ties as long as certain common computational complex-
ity assumptions hold. For instance, even if an attacker
learnt the internal state Xi at stage i, we keep unpre-
dictability to the left (the preceding bits of the binary
string are not compromised). Guessing Xi−1 from Xi
is computationally hard unless the quadratic residuosity
problem can be solved in polynomial time. Later work
showed that breaking Blum Blum Shub is equivalent to
factoring (Vazirani and Vazirani, 1985a). This is consid-
ered computationally secure in many cryptographic pro-
tocols. However, an attacker with a quantum computer
that knows N could use Shor’s algorithm for integer fac-
torization to break the security of the generator (Shor,
1997).
There are also variations of the Mersenne Twister in-
tended to make it secure for cryptographic use (Mat-
sumoto et al., 2005, 2008). Other approaches to
CSPRNGs use cryptographic protocols such as DES or
AES as blocks that transform a string of bits using as
their secret key a processed seed from the computer’s en-
tropy pool. An example is the random number genera-
tion recommendation for banking in the ANSI X9.17 key
management standard (American National Standards In-
stitute, 1985).
There are different standards and recommendations
for the cryptographic use of random number generators
in key generation (Barker and Roginsky, 2012; National
Institute of Standards and Technology, 2001) and in fi-
nancial systems (American National Standards Institute,
2006), with instructions on how to treat the sources of
entropy for seeding PRNGs (International Organization
for Standardization, 2011; Turan et al., 2016).
Cryptographical random number generators, as any
critical part in a cryptographic protocol, can be subject
to different cryptanalytic attacks (Kelsey et al., 1998).
There are also some quantum attacks that offer a moder-
ate advantage with respect to classical strategies (Guedes
et al., 2013).
7Certain generators are specifically designed for cryp-
tography and are built to avoid common attacks. An
example is the Fortuna pseudorandom number genera-
tor that uses multiple sources of entropy to reseed as
frequently as possible so that, if the generator is com-
promised at some time, the previous output remains
unguessable (Ferguson et al., 2010). This and similar
cryptographic generators are configurable and allow to
replace the protocols inside their constituent blocks.
The design of cryptographically secure RNGs is far
from trivial. There are multiple cases of faulty imple-
mentations of RNGs that have led to serious vulnerabil-
ities. One common pitfall is the failure to properly seed
the generator. Even if the transformation on the seed
is secure and cannot be inverted, if there is not enough
entropy an attacker can launch a brute force attack and
try all the possible seeds. The outputs can then be com-
pared to the output of the generator and the attacker
can predict which keys the user has generated. This
has happened many times since the early attacks on the
SSL keys generated in the Netscape Browser, which used
predictable sources like the time of the day or process
numbers to seed its generator (Goldberg and Wagner,
1996; Shepherd, 1996). Similarly, a bug int the OpenSSL
library resulted in a seed of limited entropy that used
as its only randomness source process identifiers, PID,
which have only 215 possible values (Ahmad, 2008). The
resulting possible keys could be generated by brute force
in a few hours. Poor initialization can also weaken the
random numbers in operating systems like Windows 2000
(Dorrendorf et al., 2009). A few more examples of vulner-
abilities due to initialization problems or other bad qual-
ity random number generators are weak RSA key gener-
ation in network devices (Heninger et al., 2012; Lenstra
et al., 2012), repeated or guessable keys produced in-
side smart cards (Bernstein et al., 2013; Courtois et al.,
2013; Nohl et al., 2008) and the predictable random se-
quences that are used for cryptographic purposes in An-
droid (Kim et al., 2013; Michaelis et al., 2013).
In this respect, physical RNGs, including QRNGs, can
serve as way to seed CSPRNGs, preferably as an addi-
tional source of entropy. There are still some important
precautions. Certain attacks specifically target TRNGs
(Soucarros et al., 2013; Zheng and Matsumoto, 1997) and
they can be sensitive to environmental variables (Soucar-
ros et al., 2011). There are already some proposals to test
QRNG (Walenta et al., 2015) under the online test of the
BSI AIS 20/31 standard (Killmann and Schindler, 2011)
to make sure they do not fail during operation. As long
as these aspects are taken into account, the relatively
high rate of QRNGs makes them also a viable option to
directly generate keys, probably after some kind of post-
processing.
In fact quantum key distribution, QKD, (Bennett
and Brassard, 1984; Ekert, 1991; Gisin et al., 2002; Lo
et al., 2014; Scarani et al., 2009) can be seen as nothing
more than a very sophisticated distributed secure ran-
dom number generator that includes a physical method
to generate entropy and a randomness amplification al-
gorithm that weeds out the bits that could have been
compromised (Owens et al., 2008).
In that interpretation, many quantum hacking meth-
ods can be considered as attacks to an RNG or to the
randomness generation block inside the QKD system
(Stipcˇevic´, 2014). For instance, in detector blinding at-
tacks (Gerhardt et al., 2011; Lydersen et al., 2010), an at-
tacker can selectively disable the detectors in the receiver
and eliminate any randomness in the measurement, de-
termining the result. Similarly, time shift attacks take
advantage of different detection efficiencies with time to
make measurement in a chosen basis more or less likely
introducing a bias (Zhao et al., 2008) and attacks based
on imperfect beam splitters perform a similar feat by in-
troducing unbalances in the way the quantum states are
directed to each measurement configuration (Li et al.,
2011).
QKD protocols assume they have access to true ran-
domness and QRNGs are quite adequate for that pur-
pose. We will see they are faster than alternative
TRNGs, produce random numbers of good quality and
suppose small deviations from the usual configuration of
the equipment (they can be built with the same technol-
ogy and their cost is only a small fraction of the total).
D. Random numbers in fundamental science
Finally, truly random numbers play a special role in
experiments that try to determine the nature of the
world. For philosophical reasons, in some proof of prin-
ciple experiments we need to remove any possible bias
when choosing a measurement or when making other de-
cision. To this respect, quantum random number gener-
ators stand in a privileged position. Quantum mechanics
is the only theory that, according to our understanding,
offers true randomness.
This is particularly important in many experiments on
the foundations of quantum mechanics, where many of
the thought experiments that helped to shape our un-
derstanding of the quantum theory have entered the lab
and can be tested experimentally (Shadbolt et al., 2014).
Quantum random numbers can also appear in any ex-
periment where we want to be sure there is no hidden
bias or that our decisions are independent from previous
states of the system. Curiously, one of the early quantum
random number generators based on radioactive decay,
described in Section V, was designed as a way to remove
bias in parapsychology experiments (Schmidt, 1970a,b).
Later, QRNGs have become part in experiments where
randomness is a philosophical necessity.
Quantum random number generators are a good solu-
tion in experiments that test the predictions of the quan-
8tum theory. They can be built with equipment similar
to that of the experiment or even be integrated into the
experimental setup. While we must trust the inherent
randomness of quantum effects, they can be instrumen-
tal in exploring other aspects of quantum mechanics like
complementarity or nonlocality that are not directly de-
pendent on the randomness of quantum measurement.
Experimental tests of properties like the wave-particle
duality usually require to take random decisions in a
short time and quantum random number generators can
fulfil that mission.
Experimental tests of Bell’s Inequality (Brunner et al.,
2014) need a random choice of basis which can be done
with an external QRNG connected to a switch like in the
experiments of (Weihs et al., 1998) and (Scheidl et al.,
2010) that used the QRNG in (Jennewein et al., 2000)
or with a passive choice, where the quantum random-
ness comes from separating the paths of the photons in
the experiment in a balanced beam splitter (Tittel et al.,
1999), which can be equivalent in the right conditions
(Gisin and Zbinden, 1999).
We also need true randomness for Wheeler’s delayed
choice experiment in which a photon inside an interfer-
ometer can behave like a wave or a particle depending
on whether we close the interferometer or not (Wheeler,
1978). If the choice is delayed to after the photon is
inside the interferometer, the photon must be able to be-
have both as a wave and a particle3 as the complete setup
had not been decided when the photon entered it. From a
fundamental point of view, it is crucial that the decision
is made after the photon enters the interferometer. We
need a fast and truly random number generator. The
experiment in (Alley et al., 1984) uses a single photon
from a weak light source with a 50% probability of firing
a detector connected to a switch and the experiments in
(Jacques et al., 2007, 2008) make this decision using a
QRNG based on the measurement of the amplified shot
noise of white light.
Other experiments include delayed-choice experiments
based on entanglement swapping (Yurke and Stoler,
1992; Zukowski et al., 1993) after Peres’s proposal (Peres,
2000) in which whether two photons are entangled or
not is decided after they have been measured (Ma et al.,
2012) and in quantum erasure experiments that erase
path information (Ma et al., 2013a), in both cases using
the QRNG of (Jennewein et al., 2000).
3 Indeed, the experiments show the photon can also behave as
different combinations in between, with different degrees of visi-
bility and distinguishability.
III. BLOCK DESCRIPTION
Physical random number generators can be divided
into separate blocks with well-defined subtasks. The
two most important blocks are the entropy source and
the postprocessing stage. The entropy source consists of
a physical system with some random physical quantity
and the measurement equipment that reads these random
variables. In digital random number generators we usu-
ally need to convert analog measurements into bit strings
with the help of analog-to-digital converters. Measure-
ment and quantization are noisy processes and there will
be some contamination in what is called the raw bit string
even if the measured quantity is truly random and free
from correlations. The postprocessing block takes the raw
bits and distills a shorter sequence without correlations.
The most important phase in postprocessing is ran-
domness extraction. Randomness extractors are func-
tions that transform the bits from the raw sequence into
a uniform random sequence at the output with most or
all of the randomness available in the input.
Figure 1 shows the block diagram of a typical physical
random number generator. The exact parts vary from
device to device. For instance, some physical random
number generators are designed to produce raw sequences
with negligible bias and forgo the postprocessing phase.
There is a delicate balance in choosing an adequate post-
processing system. More involved randomness extraction
methods usually allow to minimize the amount of random
bits that are thrown away, but are slower. The overall bit
rate depends on whether the increased production of bits
compensates or not for the slower processing circuit or if
it is justified to use a faster but more complex hardware
to remove biases from the raw bit sequence.
Physical system
Entropy source
Measurement
Raw bits
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Postprocessing
1 0 1 1 0 0
random sequence
Extracted
FIG. 1 Block diagram of a typical physical random number
generator. A measurement system registers an unpredictable
magnitude from a well-characterized physical system and con-
verts the results into a binary raw bit sequence, which can still
show some bias. The postprocessing stage extracts a smaller,
ideally bias-free, random sequence assuming some bound to
the amount of randomness of the raw sequence. The estima-
tion usually comes from a thorough analysis of the original
random physical system and the measurement errors.
In this review, we concentrate on the different quantum
systems that can work as an entropy source. Section V
describes measurements of radioactive decay. Section VII
explains the many possible sources of entropy available in
quantum optics. Section VIII discusses alternative quan-
tum systems that do not use light.
9Section X gives a brief review on some classical post-
processing algorithms used to remove existing biases and
Section XI introduces different quantum protocols that
can be combined with imperfect randomness sources to
obtain uniform output strings.
Before describing the particular systems from which
quantum random number generators obtain randomness,
in Section IV we comment the most common ways to
measure entropy and the contexts in which each entropy
measure can be applied. Different authors choose differ-
ent criteria that will be mentioned when we describe the
corresponding quantum random number generator.
In certain quantum random number generators, like
device independent generators (Section IX.B), the physi-
cal measurement process and randomness estimation and
extraction are intimately linked and we discuss them to-
gether.
IV. ENTROPY ESTIMATION
Entropy in its many forms offers a convenient way
to measure randomness. The different entropies give a
mathematical measure for surprise (how unexpected a
value is). We express entropy in bits, in the information
theory sense, which is closely related to the concept of
thermodynamic entropy but takes it to a more natural
formulation for information processing and communica-
tions.
A simple interesting measure is Shannon entropy
(Shannon, 1948). For a random variable X with a prob-
ability distribution PX so that PX(x) is the probability
of getting the outcome x from a discrete set A (an alpha-
bet) with N possible values for x, the Shannon entropy
of X , H(X), is defined as
H(X) = −
∑
x∈A
PX(x) log2 PX(x). (3)
Shannon entropy gives the average number of bits of in-
formation we can extract from a single outcome. For an
alphabet of cardinality N = |A| and a uniform proba-
bility distribution, all the results are equally likely and
we need log2N bits to describe them. We can imagine
we place all the possible outcomes in a table and assign
a log2N -bit string to each of them. In a uniform ran-
dom process all the outcomes are equally “surprising”
and we need to use all the bits. Less surprising distri-
butions where some results are more likely than others
would need, on average, less bits to be described. Table
I shows an example of bit representations for the results
of throwing a balanced and an unbalanced four-sided die
(a tetrahedron).
Shannon entropy offers a rough estimation of random-
ness. Ideally, we would like to generate an almost uniform
distribution with a Shannon entropy as close to log2N
as possible. A higher Shannon entropy means we have
Fair die
x P (x) Sequence
1 1/4 00
2 1/4 01
3 1/4 10
4 1/4 11
Loaded die
x P (x) Sequence
1 1/2 0
2 1/4 10
3 1/8 110
4 1/8 111
TABLE I Entropy calculation example for a fair and a loaded
four-sided die. For each possible outcome of a throw (first
column) there is an associated probability shown in the second
column. The third column shows a possible way to assign a
bit sequence to each outcome. For a balanced die (left table)
we have two bits of entropy H(X) = −4(1/4) log2(1/4) = 2.
For a loaded die (right table), we have an entropy H(X) =
−(1/2) log2(1/2) − (1/4) log2(1/4) − 2(1/8) log2(1/8) = 1.75.
For the given encoding, we can check we need an average of
1(1/2) + 2(1/4) + 2 · 3(1/8) = 1.75 bits to describe the result.
a distribution closer to uniform and that we can extract
more random bits from the process, but there are other
entropy measures that can give us a more useful figure
when deciding how to use a randomness extractor to
make the most efficient use of the available randomness,
as described in Section X.
An interesting generalization of Shannon entropy is the
family of Re´nyi entropies (Re´nyi, 1961). The Re´nyi en-
tropy of order α is defined as
Hα(X) =
1
1− α log2
∑
x∈A
PX(x)
α. (4)
Shannon entropy corresponds to the Re´nyi entropy in the
limit α → 1. For any distribution, Re´nyi entropies obey
the inequality
Hα(X) ≥ Hβ(X) (5)
for α ≤ β. Entropies of a different orders appear in many
security proofs and randomness bounds (Cachin, 1997).
A particularly useful quantity is the min-entropy
H∞(X), which comes from taking the Re´nyi entropy
when α→∞. Alternatively, it can be defined as
H∞ = − log2
(
max
x∈A
PX(x)
)
(6)
where we take the logarithm of the probability of the
most likely outcome. The min-entropy gives a lower,
worst-case bound to all the Re´nyi entropies. 2−H∞(X)
corresponds to the probability of guessing at the first at-
tempt the outcome from measuring a random variable
X with a known distribution. The optimal strategy is
guessing the result is the most likely one. In the ex-
ample given in Table I, for the uniform distribution the
min-entropy is 2, but for the loaded die we have a value
− log2(1/2) = 1. If we guess an outcome 1 we are right
half of the time.
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In a distribution with min-entropy k, every possible
outcome x has a bounded probability PX(x) ≤ 2−k. Any
probability distribution of min-entropy k can be written
as a convex combination of distributions that are uni-
form for k bits. This gives an important interpretation
of min-entropy as the number of uniform bits that can
be extracted from a given distribution. Intuitively, if no
single string is too likely, for every random outcome we
can extract about k bits of “surprise”, but no more (Chor
and Goldreich, 1988; Zuckerman, 1990).
There are explicit constructions, like Trevisan’s ex-
tractor (Trevisan, 2001) and derived functions (Shaltiel,
2002), that can give almost k bits with a probability dis-
tribution as close to uniform as desired, provided there
are some ancillary random bits of good quality. There
are different kinds of randomness extractors (see Section
X) in which min-entropy or derived quantities offer an
upper bound on the number of available random bits.
Re´nyi entropies, including Shannon entropy and min-
entropy, can be generalized to study joint distributions
where part of the system is in the power of a legitimate
user A and part of the system, which can be correlated to
the first part, is in the possession of an eavesdropper B.
In random number generation, the most useful quantity is
conditional min-entropy. In the most general case, we can
include distributions that come from quantum systems if
we consider the density matrix ρAB of a state in the joint
Hilbert space HAB = HA ⊗ HB with a subspace that is
restricted to A, HA, and a subspace only B can access,
HB. The conditional min-entropy of ρAB related to a
reduced density state σB in HB is defined as
H∞(A|B)ρ = sup
σB
(− log2 λ), (7)
where λ is the smallest real number for which
λIA ⊗ σB − ρAB (8)
is nonnegative (Renner, 2005) when IA is the identity
matrix corresponding to HA and we maximize over the
density matrices σB with trace 1 describing the subsys-
tem in HB. Conditional min-entropy gives how much
information about the results of a measurement by A
can be inferred from measurements on B alone. For clas-
sical distributions, 2−H∞(A|B)ρ gives the probability of
guessing the outcomes of A from our knowledge of B us-
ing the optimal strategy (Ko¨nig et al., 2009). If there is
no side information (the systems of A and B are uncor-
related), we recover the definition and interpretation of
the min-entropy in Equation (6).
When considering randomness extractors, it is also in-
teresting to speak of the smooth min-entropy
Hǫ∞(A|B)ρ = sup
ρ˜
H∞(A|B)ρ˜ (9)
with a supremum taken over all the nonnegative opera-
tors ρ˜AB of trace 1 that are close to ρAB in the sense
that ||ρ˜AB − ρAB|| ≤ ǫ for the L1-norm ||A|| = tr
√
A†A
(Ko¨nig and Renner , 2011).
Instead of giving asymptotic parameters, like tradi-
tional entropies, smooth entropies give results valid for
a single sample of a distribution. In random number
generators, smooth min-entropy is useful as an estima-
tor of the amount of random bits we can extract from a
randomness source that might be correlated with an ex-
ternal attacker. Smooth min-entropy gives a tight bound
on the length of the bits that a randomness extractor can
produce from a given joint distribution and still give an
output as close to uniform as desired and uncorrelated to
any external system (Ko¨nig et al., 2009; Renner, 2005).
For a general unknown source, estimating the min-
entropy is far from trivial. The problem is intractable for
any reasonable sampling circuit with limited size (Lyngsø
and Pedersen, 2002; Watson, 2016). We can only deter-
mine min-entropy from measurement inefficiently. If our
randomness source is stable and faraway bits are indepen-
dent, this cost can be paid just once during characteri-
zation. Normally, physical random number generators
use conservative, worst-case bounds for the min-entropy
based on a deep analysis of the physical origin of the ran-
domness and there are standardized methods for online
estimation (Turan et al., 2016). In that respect, quantum
random number generators offer a clear advantage: their
source of randomness is usually a very well defined quan-
tum phenomenon. Quantum theory gives very accurate
predictions. When compared to other random number
generators that gather noise from complex processes like
atmospheric noise, quantum random number generators
have the virtue of a precise description of the random-
ness source which can be used to derive limits to the avail-
able min-entropy, even accounting for additional classical
noise or the presence of eavesdroppers.
Nevertheless, even for these well-characterized quan-
tum randomness sources, hidden correlations remain a
challenge. There might be memory effects or correla-
tions between consecutive runs of the quantum experi-
ment that gives our random numbers and we must take
due care to ensure independence and the lack of any ex-
perimental bias.
V. QUANTUM RANDOM NUMBER GENERATORS
BASED ON RADIOACTIVE DECAY
A. The first quantum random number generators
With the rise of computer simulation during the sec-
ond half of the 20th century, there was a growing need
for electronic random number generators (Hull and Do-
bell, 1962). At that time, it was common to find tables
of random numbers. The most famous of such compi-
lations is probably the book “A million random digits
with 100,000 normal deviates” from the RAND Corpo-
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ration (RAND Corporation, 1955). The numbers in the
book were generated using an electronic roulette wheel
and were available in punched card format to allow easy
interfacing with computers. There also appeared many
electronic random number generators designed to be con-
nected to computers or output devices like teleprinters
(Sowey, 1972).
It was only natural for some researchers to turn to the
intrinsic source of randomness of quantum phenomena
(Isida and Ikeda, 1956; Manelis, 1961; Schmidt, 1970b;
Vincent, 1970). Radioactive decay was a particularly ac-
cessible source of true randomness. Geiger-Mu¨ller tubes
were already sensitive enough to capture and amplify
α, β and γ radiation and reliable, well-characterized ra-
dioactive samples were available. For simplicity, most
radioactivity-based quantum random number generators
were based on the detection of β radiation (emitted elec-
trons).
In a Geiger-Mu¨ller, GM, detector a single particle pro-
duces an ionization event that is amplified in a Townsend
avalanche (Friedman, 1949). The result is a device that,
when correctly configured, produces a pulse for each de-
tected particle. The probability of any given atom to
decay in a time interval (t, t + dt) is given by an ex-
ponential random variable so that P (t)dt = λme
−λmtdt
for a material with a decay constant λm. If the sam-
ple retains many of its original atoms (we are in times
much smaller than the half-life) and the sample-detector
system undergoes practically no change during our time
interval (the position of the sample is constant, the gas
in the GM tube does not become contaminated. . . ), the
time between detected pulses is also an exponential ran-
dom variable. The times are independent from previous
results and the number of pulses that arrive in a fixed
time period follows a Poisson distribution. The exact
rate depends on many factors, but it can be determined
experimentally and we can be satisfied that the pulses ar-
rive at independent times (Silverman et al., 1999). The
probability of finding m pulses in an observation period
of T seconds is Pm(T ) =
(λT )m
m! e
−λT , where λ gives the
mean number of pulses we detect in one second for our
source and corresponds to the parameter of the exponen-
tial distribution.
The QRNGs we describe in this Section are the fore-
runners of the present day optical QRNGs we will see in
Section VII that use similar concepts and circuits, but
replace the radioactive source and the GM counter with
photon sources and detectors.
The first QRNGs based on radioactive decay share
many common elements. Most use digital counters to
convert the pulses from the detector into random digits.
A digital counter increases its output value by 1 when
it receives a pulse at its input and can be reset to start
the count from 0. Another key element is timing with a
digital clock. These QRNGs can be best explained if we
speak in terms of fast and slow clocks to describe clocks
with a frequency ν that is significantly greater or smaller
than the mean rate of detection. A fast clock, with ν > λ,
generates many pulses between Geiger counts and when
a slow clock, with ν < λ, produces a pulse, there has
been enough time to have registered many counts in the
GM detector.
With these elements, the randomness in the time of
arrival can be converted into random digits in a few dif-
ferent ways. The generators of Isida and Ikeda (Isida and
Ikeda, 1956) and Vincent (Vincent, 1970) use a counter
driven by a fast clock that is read and then reset to zero
every time we get a count on the detector. The value
of the counter at the moment of the detection is used to
produce the random number. Figure 2 gives a graphical
description of the method. The distribution of values is
t
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FIG. 2 Fast clock method: A fast clock (down) is used to
increase a counter. Whenever a detection is made (up), the
counter is read and reset, generating one random number.
not uniform and some correction is necessary. If we are
producing decimal digits, we can take the least significant
figure (Isida and Ikeda, 1956). The equivalent method for
binary sequences is looking at the parity of the value of
the counter, checking if the number of counted pulses
is even or odd (Vincent, 1970). This kind of correction
draws from previous results for true random number gen-
erators that face similar problems (Thomson, 1959).
A second option is to use a slow clock to determine
when to read the counter. In the generator of Schmidt
(Schmidt, 1970b), the pulses from the GM detector in-
crease the value of a counter. When the slow clock pro-
duces a new pulse, the value of the counter is used as
a random digit and the count starts again from 0. The
output corresponds to the number of particle counts in
each clock period. We restrict to a counter that gener-
ates values from 0 toM −1, a moduloM counter. When
M = 2 we have a binary random number generator. The
distribution of the sampled digits is not uniform, but if
we take the modulo M addition of multiple outputs, we
can obtain a distribution with as small a bias as desired.
This is called “contraction” and is discussed in detail in
Schmidt’s paper (Schmidt, 1970b). Figure 3 shows an
example of this generation method.
Radioactive decay has also been used to generate white
noise for analog computers (Goodyear Aircraft Corpora-
tion, 1954; Howe, 1961; Manelis, 1961). Random noise
generation was important, among others, in the analog
calculations in airplane design simulations. It also has
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FIG. 3 Slow clock method: The Geiger detector is read at
fixed intervals, generating a random number that equals to
the number of detections during the period.
applications as a test signal and, generally, in communi-
cations and simulation problems where a broadband sig-
nal is necessary (Gupta, 1975). In this case, the pulses
from the GM detector trigger a change of state in a volt-
age signal. Whenever a particle is detected the signal
goes from high to low voltage or from low to high. The
resulting random signal is called random telegraph noise
(Rice, 1944). In this case we do not want a binary signal,
but Gaussian noise. Instead of sampling, the signal is
directed to a low pass filter to complete the noise gener-
ator.
B. Evolution
After the initial proposals, there have been different
refinements to the basic concept. QRNGs based on ra-
dioactive decay are still popular. A good example is the
web-based random number server HotBits (Walker, 1996)
that has been working since 1996. In the HotBits gener-
ator, the random times of arrival of the radiation to the
Geiger counter give pairs of intervals of random length.
The time between two consecutive pulses is stored as t1
and compared to the time between the next two pulses
t2. The random bits come from comparing the times. If
t1 > t2 we output a 0 bit and if t1 < t2 we output a 1.
The generator reverses the criterion for 0 and 1 for every
time pair in order to compensate for small systematic
biases that might favour slightly unbalanced intervals.
This provides a crude correction for small problems like,
for instance, the loss of radioactive material due to ra-
dioactive disintegration that makes the second interval
shorter on average by a very short time. Figure 4 gives
a graphical description of the method.
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100
FIG. 4 Time difference method: This method compares the
time between two events in the Geiger detector. If ti < ti+1
then a bit with value one is generated. Otherwise, the bit
generated will be zero.
Some modern proposals replace Geiger counters with
semiconductor detectors. Semiconductor devices such as
PIN photodiodes can also capture the radiation from ra-
dioactive decay (Knoll, 2010; Lutz, 2007). Semiconduc-
tor detectors are convenient, as they do not require the
same high voltage as Geiger tubes. The resulting signal is
weaker than that of GM counters, but there are low noise
amplifiers that can produce output pulses of a few volts
of amplitude. While they can have different sensitivities
and need calibration, for the generation of random num-
bers the important property is not as much determining
the actual rate of the particles coming out of the source
as it is registering random events.
Using off-the-shelf semiconductor devices can simplify
the design of random number generators. One example
of such generators is given by (Alkassar et al., 2005) with
a variation of the time interval method. Instead of com-
paring the time between pulses, the system reads a fast
clock every time a pulse arrives. If the clock is in a high
state (in the high voltage level of the clock cycle) at the
moment of arrival the generator outputs a 1. If it is low
it outputs a 0. For a good time resolution, the least sig-
nificant bit of the digitized time should be random and
there is no need for postcorrection.
Two other proposals for QRNGs that use semiconduc-
tor detectors with radioactive decay appear in (Duggi-
rala et al., 2010). The first proposal tries to address the
problem that in QRNG we have access to an exponen-
tial random variable, the time of arrival, or a Poisson
random variable, the number of pulses in a fixed time
interval. But, in many occasions, RNGs are required
to produce uniform random numbers. An exponential
random variable of parameter λ can be converted to a
uniform random variable if we compute:
U = e−λE , (10)
where U is the uniform distribution and E the exponen-
tial distribution. The first proposal of (Duggirala et al.,
2010) addresses this with an RC circuit. They use a
semiconductor detector whose output pulses trigger the
fast discharge of a capacitor. The voltage at the RC cir-
cuit when a pulse arrives is the output variable. This
approach has several limitations. It needs specialized
hardware to transform the voltage to the output and has
problems with noise. For that reason there is an alter-
native proposal with an approach similar to (Isida and
Ikeda, 1956; Vincent, 1970), where a fast clock ν ≫ λ
drives an N -bit counter which is read when a pulse ar-
rives. Here, the clock is supposed to be fast enough to
guarantee the samples are uniform in the 2N values.
C. Limitations
While QRNGs based on radioactive decay are a good
way to obtain high quality true random numbers, they
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have some drawbacks that limit their practical use. An
important barrier is the low bit rate they can achieve,
usually below a few hundred kilobits per second.
The first problem is the need for a radioactive source.
In principle, all decay-based QRNGs could work on back-
ground radiation. Unless it is isolated, a detector will
count stray cosmic rays, radiation from radium, thorium
or other radioactive materials in the Earth’s crust or
particles from radon on air. However, natural activity
rarely produces enough particles to cause more that a few
counts per second. This poses a fundamental problem for
the widespread use of radioactive decay QRNGs. In order
to achieve a fast rate, the QRNG needs a highly radioac-
tive source. The reviewed generators used Cobalt-60
(Isida and Ikeda, 1956), Strontium-90 (Schmidt, 1970b),
Caesium-137 (Walker, 1996), Americium-241 (Alkassar
et al., 2005) or Nickel-63 (Duggirala et al., 2010). This
is highly inconvenient and requires improved safety mea-
sures. While α sources like Americium are easier to iso-
late and are common in smoke alarms, the additional
precautions prevent straightforward computer integra-
tion and this approach works well only for dedicated iso-
lated servers like HotBits (Walker, 1996).
A second limitation to the generated bit rate is the dead
time of the detectors. In Geiger counters the avalanche
that amplifies each count ionizes the gas inside the GM
tube. The avalanche stops when the positive ions sur-
round the cathode inside the tube. These ions prevent
further avalanches until they have returned to their nor-
mal state (Friedman, 1949). The dead time is the mini-
mum time for the GM tube to recover its full detection
capability and can go from tens of nanoseconds to a few
microseconds. This limits the count rate to the MHz
range. Semiconductor detectors also need to replenish
the carriers after each detection and have dead times in
the microsecond range.
Dead time and other sources of non-uniformity need
to be corrected when generating random bits. Vincent
describes some important cautions in a follow-up paper
(Vincent, 1971) to his original generator proposal. In
general, the quality of the generated bits will be good
and, when there is some residual bias, there exist simple
postprocessing methods to recover a random output.
A final problem specific to semiconductor detectors is
the damage they suffer from radiation. Geiger tubes also
degrade with time, but the effect of radiation on them
has been extensively studied, while semiconductors used
specifically for radiation detection are relatively new. As
long as the damage gives a progressive and slow reduc-
tion in efficiency, the output would retain randomness,
but more studies on the long term behaviour of these
detectors are needed.
Despite these constraints, radioactive decay is a suit-
able source of randomness for low speed applications.
It can, for instance, be used to provide entropy for the
seed of pseudorandom number generators. For more de-
manding systems that require high bit rates or when we
would like to avoid radioactive sources, the recent optical
QRNGs described in Section VII are good substitutes.
VI. RANDOM NUMBER GENERATORS BASED ON
NOISE
Noise in electronic circuits is one of the preferred
sources of entropy in classical physical random number
generators. Noise appears as an unwanted effect in elec-
tronic systems of all kinds and it is readily available. A
typical random number generator using noise is shown in
Figure 5.
AmplifierNoise source Comparator
+A
-
FIG. 5 Conceptual representation of a typical noise-based
random number generator. The voltage coming from a source
of white noise is amplified and compared to a threshold in a
comparator to produce a digital signal with random transition
times. This signal can be sampled or processed later to give
a random bit sequence.
The noise source is represented as a resistor, but other
elements can take its place. A Zener diode operated in
the reverse breakdown region is another popular choice.
In this scheme, voltage fluctuations due to noise are am-
plified and compared to a threshold to generate random
bits. For a threshold of 0 volts, we can sample the ampli-
fied noise periodically and assign a 0 if we find a negative
voltage and a 1 to a positive voltage.
If, instead of sampling, we generate a pulse every time
the voltage from a white noise source crosses the thresh-
old, the output will be a series of pulses with times of
arrival that correspond to a Poisson distribution and we
can use any of the methods described in Section V to
produce random sequences. The electronic noise circuit
replaces the Geiger counter in an otherwise unchanged
system. In fact, many proposals for QRNG based on ra-
dioactive decay discuss both methods in parallel (Gude,
1985; Vincent, 1970).
There are multiple examples of true random number
generators based on this electronic noise like those in
(Holman et al., 1997; Petrie and Connelly, 2000) to name
a few.
Noise in those systems comes fundamentally from
two sources, shot, or Schottky, noise (Schottky, 1918)
and thermal, or Johnson-Nyquist, noise (Johnson, 1928;
Nyquist, 1928), with flicker noise contributing sometimes
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at low frequencies. Shot noise generates from quantum
effects due to the granularity of the current. Currents
are formed by discrete carriers and show quantum fluc-
tuations. Thermal noise comes from thermal agitation of
the carriers and is produced by statistical motion that de-
pends on the temperature. In practice, both noises tend
to appear side by side and are difficult to isolate. In many
cases the frontier between shot and thermal fluctuations
is blurry (Landauer, 1993).
In this review, we will not discuss in detail random
number generators based on electronic noise. While elec-
tronic noise coming from shot fluctuations can be right-
fully said to be quantum (Reznikov et al., 1998), it is usu-
ally not well characterized and separated from thermal
noise, it is subject to many environmental fluctuations
and can show memory effects (Stipcˇevic´, 2012). Some-
what arbitrarily, we choose to concentrate on generators
where the quantum effects are well isolated and we have a
higher degree of control. Unless there is some interesting
effect, we will not discuss true random number genera-
tors where quantum noise is only an unquantified part of
the total available randomness.
There are a few interesting exceptions. Certain com-
mercial quantum random number generators use elec-
tronic noise in semiconductors. For Comscire’s QRNG
there is a detailed estimation of the quantum entropy
gathered from shot noise in MOS transistors (ComScire,
2014). Likewise, under the right conditions, Zener diodes
can be operated in a regime where quantum shot noise
dominates (Somlo, 1975; Stipcˇevic´, 2004).
VII. OPTICAL QUANTUM RANDOM NUMBER
GENERATORS
Most of the existing QRNGs are based on quantum
optics. The inherent randomness in many parameters
of the quantum states of light allows for a rich choice of
implementations. Light from lasers, light emitting diodes
or single photon sources is a convenient and affordable
substitute for radioactive material as a source of quantum
randomness and there are many available detectors. In
this section, we study some of the most common ways to
harness quantum light to produce random bits.
First, we give an overview of the concepts of quantum
optics that appear in the generators. Then, we propose
a classification of optical quantum random number gen-
erators, OQRNGs, based on the generation mechanism.
Table II gives a summary of the covered optical genera-
tors with some representative examples, the typical bit
rates and the limitations of each kind of generator.
A. Quantum optics in random number generators
The optical field can be described at the quantum
level in terms of photons (Klauder and Sudarshan, 1968;
Loudon, 2001). From the many possible families of quan-
tum states, Fock states and coherent states give the most
relevant description of the quantum states of light in ran-
dom number generators. Fock states, or number states,
are described as states |n〉 that contain n photons shar-
ing a mode (they have the same frequency, polarization,
temporal profile and a common path). Coherent states,
which share many properties with classical light, can be
written as a superposition of number states
|α〉 = e− |α|
2
2
∞∑
n=0
αn√
n!
|n〉 (11)
where α is a complex number. The amplitude |α|2 corre-
sponds to the mean photon number of the state. Weak
laser light is an excellent approximation to a coherent
state. We can also use the coherent states from a laser
to produce a proxy for single photon states by choosing a
low enough intensity, as it usual, for instance, in quantum
key distribution with typical values of α around 0.1.
In many applications we are only interested in produc-
ing uncorrelated single photons. In that case, attenuated
light from a light emitting diode, LED, can be valid as
long as we generate photons with a separation larger than
the coherence time of the source.
There are many different technologies that can gen-
erate single photons and detect them (Buller and
Collins, 2009; Eisaman et al., 2011). Photomultiplier
tubes (PMTs), single photon avalanche photodiodes
(SPADs) operating in the Geiger mode or superconduct-
ing nanowire detectors are some of the most popular de-
tectors, but there is a growing number of alternatives
(Hadfield, 2009). For instance, there have been impor-
tant advances in silicon detectors (Ghioni et al., 2007)
that open the door to integration in electronic circuits
and in superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors
that extend the high-efficiency detection wavelengths to
the near infrared (Marsili et al., 2013).
Traditionally, while binary decisions between no pho-
tons and one or more photons are relatively easy to take,
single photon detectors have limited photon counting ca-
pabilities. There are new improved detectors, but their
cost is still high and most applications use a binary ap-
proach to photon detection. Another limitation to most
single photon detectors is the time they need to recover
after a detection, known as dead time. We will later see
how these limitations affect our quantum random num-
ber generators.
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Type (Section) Physical principle Representative examples Rate (order) Challenges
Branching path (VII.B)
Path superposition
+
measurement
(Jennewein et al., 2000) Mbps
- Unbalanced detectors.
- Detector dead time.
Time of arrival (VII.C) Time of arrival statistics
(Stipcˇevic´ et al., 2007)
(Wayne et al., 2009)
(Wahl et al., 2011)
Mbps
- Time precision.
- Detector dead time.
Photon counting (VII.D) Photon number statistics
(Fu¨rst et al., 2010)
(Ren et al., 2011)
Mbps
- Photon resolving capability.
- Detector dead time.
Attenuated pulse (VII.E)
Binary measurement
of coherent states
(Wei and Guo, 2009a) Mbps
- Source instability.
- Detector dead time.
Vacuum fluctuations (VII.F) Shot noise measurement
(Gabriel et al., 2010)
(Shen et al., 2010)
(Symul et al., 2011)
Mbps-Gbps
- Classical noise.
- Postprocessing.
Phase noise (VII.G) Laser phase noise
(Guo et al., 2010)
(Qi et al., 2010)
(Jofre et al., 2011)
Gbps
- Phase drift.
- Pulse repetition rate.
Amplified Spontaneous
Emission, ASE (VII.H)
Amplitude fluctuations in
ASE noise
(Williams et al., 2010)
(Argyris et al., 2012)
Gbps
- Sampling/digitization.
- Postprocessing.
Raman Scattering (VII.I)
Interaction with
phonon fluctuations
(Bustard et al., 2011)
(Collins et al., 2015)
kbps-Mbps
- Raman gain. (Stimulated)
- Detector dead time.
(Spontaneous)
Optical Parametric
Oscillators, OPOs (VII.J)
Bistability in optical
parametric oscillators
(Marandi et al., 2011)
(Marandi et al., 2012b)
kbps
- Cavity decay time.
- Pump repetition rate.
TABLE II Summary of the optical methods for quantum random number generation. The table gives the section where we
describe the details of each implementation, the principle of operation, a few representative examples, the order of magnitude
of the typical bit rates of each generator and a list of the most important limitations.
B. Branching path generators
OQRNGs take advantage of the random nature of
quantum measurement. In a large number of quantum
random number generators this measurement is taken
over photons in a superposition of two or more paths.
For instance, if we define a state |1〉1 |0〉2 which repre-
sents one photon in the first of two possible paths and
a state |0〉1 |1〉2 with the photon in the second path, we
can prepare a superposition
|1〉1 |0〉2 + |0〉1 |1〉2√
2
. (12)
Measuring that state with a detector at the end of each
path will result in a click in just one of the detectors with
a probability one half for each path. There are many
quantum optics experiments that generate similar states
in Mach-Zehnder interferometers and related optical se-
tups. Figure 6 shows the archetypal QRNG that uses
quantum measurement with detectors in different posi-
tions as proposed for the choice of basis in QKD4 (Rarity
4 In the most popular quantum key distribution protocols, like
BB84 (Bennett and Brassard, 1984), E91 (Ekert, 1991) or
et al., 1994). In this configuration, we have a balanced
Photon source
Beam splitter
D1
D0
FIG. 6 A weak light source sends a state with one photon to
a balanced beam splitter. The path the photon takes at the
output is random and there will be a detection with the same
probability at each detector. We can consider that a click on
detector D0 is recorded as a 0 bit and a detection in D1 is a
1.
beam splitter with equal transmissivity and reflectivity
SARG04 (Scarani et al., 2004), the receiver must choose its mea-
surement basis at random. We can imagine a switch connected
to an RNG that directs the incoming photons to one of two alter-
native measurement setups depending on the result. In practice,
the implementation might be different.
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T = R = 12 so that classical light entering any of the two
input ports would be divided into two streams of the same
optical power, half going through and half reflecting. If
we have a single photon in one input and the vacuum in
the second, we cannot divide the power and we have the
desired path superposition. Conceptually, the simplest
way to produce random numbers from this path division
is placing two detectors D0 and D1, one for each output,
and generate a bit every time we detect a photon. Clicks
in D0 would produce a 0 bit and clicks in D1 would pro-
duce a 1. Optical QRNGs using spatial superpositions
usually apply variations on this basic scheme. In fact,
in the original QKD application (Rarity et al., 1994) the
random number generator was not fully implemented as a
separate device controlling the measurement basis in the
receiver. Instead, they used a passive implementation
where the beam splitter took the input state and sent it
with equal probability to one of two measurement setups,
one for each possible basis. A complete implementation
with a beam splitter and two photomultiplier tubes as
detectors was first deployed as a subsystem in the ex-
perimental implementation of a Bell test (Weihs et al.,
1998) and later developed as a standalone device (Jen-
newein et al., 2000) with some modifications. The most
important difference is the way the random sequence is
created, with a random digital signal as an intermediate
step. In the modified model, detections in D1 take a dig-
ital signal to a high level and detections in D0 to a low
level. The result is a random signal with changes in a
time scale of the order of the inverse of the mean pho-
ton detection rate. If we sample this signal with a clock
with a frequency sufficiently below the photon detection
rate, assigning a binary 0 when the state is low and a 1
for high state, we obtain a constant stream of random
bits. The same procedure was tested with polarized pho-
tons in a linear 45◦ state and a polarizing beam splitter
with essentially the same results. In (Wang et al., 2006)
there is an alternative take on polarization to path con-
version with a weak laser source with linear polarization
attenuated to the single photon level and a Fresnel prism
that separates the positive and negative circular polar-
ization components and directs them to two avalanche
photodiodes. This kind of polarization generator can be
modified to provide adjustable probabilities for each bit
value if we include an electronically controlled polarizer
at the source, like in the fiber-based QRNG of (Xu et al.,
2015) or the decision making system in (Naruse et al.,
2015), which adapts the probability to previous results.
Other generators are implemented in optical fiber sys-
tems where a weak light pulse is directed to a balanced
fiber coupler connected to two detectors. Two examples
are the generators in (Soubusta et al., 2001, 2003), which
use a pulsed laser source that produces, after a tunable
attenuation circuit, a coherent state with an amplitude
greater than 1 that maximizes the random bit generation
rate5.
There are also implementations based on polarization
inside optical fiber, with sources that are either single
photon states or polarization entangled states
|H〉1 |V 〉2 − |V 〉1 |H〉2√
2
(13)
that are a superposition of horizontally polarized photon
states |H〉 and vertically polarized photons |V 〉 (Bron-
ner et al., 2009; Fiorentino, 2006; Fiorentino et al., 2006,
2007). The generators with entangled states produce the
photons in nonlinear crystals and use coincidence detec-
tors. One of the photons can be used as a herald or we
can watch for anticorrelated polarization measurements
in the different paths.
QRNGs with optical path branching can show a few
problems. All types of photodetectors have some kind of
dead time after a click. This can generate anticorrelation
of neighbouring bits. A detection at some time makes it
less likely to find a photon immediately after due to the
“blunted” sensitivity of the detector before full recovery.
Also, for real detectors and beam splitters we will find
slightly different detection efficiencies and coupling ra-
tios that can introduce some bias. There are a few other
concerns: afterpulsing can create correlated bits, pulses
with multiple photons can produce simultaneous detec-
tions and the presence of dark counts means there will be
occasional clicks when there are no photons. In practice,
these effects, particularly dead time, limit the maximum
generation rate to a few Mbps, which could be improved
with detectors with a smaller recovery time.
There are many ways to counteract these problems.
For instance, the generator in (Jennewein et al., 2000)
includes a setup phase in which the tube voltage and the
detection threshold of the photodetectors can be adjusted
to compensate detection efficiency and path coupling dif-
ferences. Another popular method is applying an unbias-
ing algorithm that distils a random sequence at the cost
of losing some bits. We discuss unbiasing in more detail
in Section X.
If we convert path superpositions into time superpo-
sitions we can use one detector instead of two, or more,
detectors, and avoid problems caused by having different
detection efficiencies and dark count numbers. That is
the approach in (Stefanov et al., 2000) where weak light
from a timed pulsed laser inside an optical fiber is cou-
pled into two fibers of different length connected to the
5 Ideally, we should choose the amplitude of the coherent state α
so as to maximize the probability of only one detector clicking
either due to one or more photons. For the coherent state at the
input of the beam splitter, this amplitude should be α =
√
2 ln 2,
but the final configuration uses a higher level due to additional
losses.
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same detector. The additional delay in one path per-
mits to distinguish the route of the photon. The whole
attenuation is designed to make each path equally likely.
The random bit generation rates can improve if the
generator measures more than two possible paths. Each
measurement then gives more than one random bit. W-
states of the form
|Wn〉 = |10 . . .00〉+ |01 . . . 00〉+ . . .+ |00 . . .01〉√
n
(14)
can be created by branching the photon path many times
and give the desired statistics. This approach takes
more complex devices, but integrated optical circuits
inside silicon chips can offer an economical and scal-
able alternative. Integrated circuits show less variability
and the optical couplers that replace the beam splitters
show smaller deviations from a perfectly balanced de-
vice. There have been experimental demonstrations of
integrated generators with 8 outputs that can produce 3
bits per each measurement, with potential for straight-
forward extension to 16 outputs (Gra¨fe et al., 2014).
Another important point is the choice of photon
sources. In many of the reviewed generators, the pho-
tons come from LEDs. In order to guarantee indepen-
dent photons, the rate is limited to be much smaller
than the coherence time, which is usually not a prob-
lem as the limiting factor tends to the be the dead time
of the detectors. A common alternative is using weak
laser light. However, it can be interesting to study other
photon sources. The effect of a beam splitter on the dif-
ferent quantum states of light is well known (Fearn and
Loudon, 1987; Ou et al., 1987; Prasad et al., 1987) and
the resulting counting statistics can be used in a vari-
ety of generation schemes. There are results that suggest
that true single photon sources, which show photon an-
tibunching, can increase the rate of random bits when
compared to coherent light from lasers. Brighter sources
have a faster photon rate and, in those conditions and
once all the effects are considered, single photon sources
offer the best overall random bit rates (Oberreiter and
Gerhardt, 2015).
Finally, there are QRNGs that give up beam splitters
altogether. These generators use the natural spatial un-
certainty in the generation process. For instance, the
commercial Quantis RNG has two integrated detectors
placed in positions where the spatial profile of a light
source has an equal amplitude (Ribordy et al., 2009).
A detector array allows a higher generation rate with
more of one bit per detection. In that case, there must
be some compensation for the non-uniform spatial pro-
file of most photon sources. An early incarnation of
this concept was the optical random number generator
of (Martino and Morris, 1991) that used photon count-
ing detectors with levels around the thousands of photons
and needed involved calibration procedures. More recent
OQRNG use detectors with single photon precision. One
of such generators uses a micro channel plate detector
and a wedge and strip anode to assign two coordinates
to the place where a photon from an attenuated LED
reaches a photocathode (Qiurong et al., 2014). Then, the
random bit sequence is extracted from the position using
Huffman coding to compensate for non-uniformities.
Other implementations use an integrated array of
single-photon avalanche photodiodes, SPADs, combined
with postprocessing (Burri et al., 2014; Burri and Stucki,
2013; Stucki et al., 2013). A weak light source produces
clicks in random positions of the array. We can assign a
1 to the pixels that find a photon and a 0 to the pixels
that do not click. Even if the distribution of bits in the
discrete 2D grid of the detectors is not uniform, we can
extract a random sequence if we compare two neighbour-
ing pixels, which should have almost the same probability
of detecting a photon, and then take the logical XOR of
the bits as their output. Alternatively, we can use the
whole string from the array as the input of a randomness
extraction algorithm. In these generators, apart from the
usual dead time, afterpulsing and dark counts concerns,
we have to contemplate the possibility of crosstalk be-
tween detectors. However, the effects of crosstalk can be
minimized with a proper design.
C. Time of arrival generators
There are also multiple ways to use the randomness
in photon detection times to generate random bits. The
OQRNGs in this and the following section are usually
based on the same principles as the QRNGs that detect
radioactive decay we discussed in Section V. In fact, one
of the earliest proposals for this kind of quantum ran-
dom number generator was a random pulser that tried to
simulate the arrival of radioactive counts in order to cal-
ibrate nuclear instruments (Takeuchi and Nagai, 1983).
Some methods are essentially the same than their Geiger
counter predecessors but replace radioactive materials
with light sources, which can achieve much higher bit
rates. Photon production is faster and less problematic
and the maximum bit rate is now limited by the capabil-
ities of the detectors instead of the generation speed.
The basic QRNG using time has a weak source of pho-
tons, a detector and timing circuitry that registers either
the precise time of each detection or the number of clicks
in a fixed period of time. In short time periods with
one or only a few photons on average, both the photons
coming from LED incoherent light and from the coher-
ent states from a laser arrive at the detector following
an exponentially distributed time λe−λt for an average
number of photons per second λ. The time between two
photodetections is the difference of two exponential ran-
dom variables, which is also exponential. In that case,
we can compare the time differences between the arrival
of consecutive pulses and compare two time differences
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t1 and t2. We can assign a 1 if t2 > t1 and a 0 if t1 > t2.
This gives a uniform random bit.
In time of arrival generation, precise time tagging be-
comes important. Measurement will always have a lim-
ited precision and the effects of digitizing the time inter-
vals can be noticeable. Instead of having real times t1
and t2, we have integers with the number of the counted
clock periods n1 and n2. For instance, the possibility
t1 = t2, with a negligible probability for an ideal con-
tinuous time measurement, must be taken into account.
Now we can find two consecutive measures for which we
read the same time, n1 = n2. In our basic scheme that
generates a 0 or a 1 depending on whether the second
interval is shorter than the first one or not, the output is
not defined and we must discard these results. Consider-
ing the equality as a valid result would require a different
analysis of the probabilities of each outcome and how we
assign them to a binary bit.
Figure 7 shows two potential approaches to timing with
resettable and non-resettable clocks.
t
t1 t2
1
1
1
1 1 1
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FIG. 7 Generation scheme where the arrival of the rising edge
of a detection pulse (up) starts a count of the rising edges
of a clock. The clock can be independent from the pulses
(bottom) or be reset with every incoming pulse (middle). In
the example, t2 > t1 and t4 > t3 and the output should be 11.
Using a resettable clock we find discrete times n1 = 1, n2 = 2,
n3 = 2 and n4 = 3 that produce the sequence 11 (n2 > n1
and n4 > n3), while for a fixed clock we read n1 = 1, n2 = 2,
n3 = 3 and n4 = 2 and the output is 10.
The fine details are explained at length in (Stipcˇevic´
et al., 2007), which gives one of the first optical quan-
tum random number generators that uses time detection.
This generator takes the photons from an LED arriving
at a PMT and compares the times of arrivals, in a scheme
similar to the method that compares the time of arrival of
two particles at a Geiger counter shown in Figure 4. As
expected, a fast clock with many ticks per click gives bet-
ter results as we have a higher resolution. A second con-
clusion is that using a resettable clock eliminates many
biases coming from imprecise time measurement.
A similar generator where the source of the photons, an
LED, and the detector, an SPAD, are integrated side by
side in the same chip is described in (Khanmohammadi
et al., 2015).
The random time of arrival can also be used as a sig-
nal that chooses a time bin from a clock, following the
template of the radioactive decay generators summarized
in Figure 2. The generator of (Dynes et al., 2008) uses
a gated APD detector and outputs a 1 if a photon is
found in an even clock cycle and a 0 if it is found in an
odd cycle. The scheme also adds a self-differentiating cir-
cuit to avoid biases from the capacitive response of the
detector. An interesting variation on the even-odd gener-
ation method is given in (Ma et al., 2005), where a pulsed
laser produces attenuated states with a small probability
of having one or more photons in each time bin. The
bins are grouped into pairs and output 0 is assigned to
an empty bin with no detection followed by a detection
and output 1 to a detection followed by an empty bin.
This is basically equivalent to using the parity of the time
bin where a photon is found, but discards occasional con-
secutive counts and can be extended to different ways of
grouping the time bins (Yu et al., 2010).
There are many other proposals that try to generate
random bits from time measurements. In principle, each
time difference ti is a real number and it would seem
we can extract an infinite amount of entropy from two
pulses. However, time precision limits how many usable
bits we have. If our timing information has p bits of
precision, the time bin in which we find a photon is a
random variable with N = 2p possible values and we
can compute the probability of a photon arrival in each
bin. We can then compute the relevant entropy measure
(Section IV) for our discrete probability distribution to
see how many bits of randomness are available.
Certain OQRNGs use digitized time differences with k
bits and distill the available entropy into a random bit
string with a mathematical function. In (Wayne et al.,
2009) the photons from a laser diode are detected with
an avalanche photodiode and then the least significant
bits of the measured time are collected until they reach
432 bits that are then whitened with the SHA-256 algo-
rithm (National Institute of Standards and Technology,
2012). Similarly, in (Wahl et al., 2014, 2011) an attenu-
ated LED sends photons to a photomultiplier tube and
the bits from the time of arrival are processed with a re-
silient function (Bose and Ray-Chaudhuri, 1960; Sunar
et al., 2007) chosen to take the maximum advantage of
the available entropy while doing the processing with a
function that can be efficiently implemented in hardware.
The generator of (Kravtsov et al., 2015) also tries to op-
timize extraction from quantized time differences with
hardware designed to work with minimal computation
that includes a lookup table that implements Elias’ de-
terministic randomness extraction algorithm (see Section
X.A.1 and (Elias, 1972)).
All these processing algorithms try to convert most of
the randomness available in the exponential distribution
into a uniform bit sequence and require additional hard-
ware and processing effort.
There are also ways to generate photons with a more
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uniform time of arrival. The counting statistics at a de-
tector are a function of the photon flux variation at the
source (Klauder and Sudarshan, 1968). For a laser diode
with a non-uniform current, we have an inhomogeneous
Poisson process and the waiting time at the detector can
be adjusted. The generator in (Wayne and Kwiat, 2010)
has circuit that reshapes the exponential time of arrival
distribution into an almost uniform one. For a variable
photon flux λ(t), the time of arrival is a distribution
λ(t)e−
∫
b
a
λ(t′)dt′ . (15)
Ideally, we would want a uniform distribution, which can
be approximated by driving a laser with a current that
repeats periodically a finite approximation to the func-
tion
1
T − t (16)
where T is a reset parameter that determines when to
restart the pulse cycle at the source. The current goes
back to the initial value when T finishes or when a pulse
is detected, whichever happens first.
An alternative way to “flatten” the exponential distri-
bution is taking short time bins from an external time
reference and consider the time of arrival within those
bins (Nie et al., 2014). The time when the photon ar-
rives with respect to the origin of a particular bin is a
random variable in a short, almost flat, part of the ex-
ponential time distribution, which gives a distribution
closer to that of a uniform random variable.
There are also mixed generators that use both time
and space uncertainty. For instance, the generator in (Li
et al., 2013) uses detectors in two paths to start and stop
a timer, in a method similar to the intermediate signal
generator in (Jennewein et al., 2000), and uses the re-
sulting time to generate random numbers. In order to
have a uniform probability, the scheme assigns a binary
string to non-uniform ranges of time measurements that
have the same probability. The generator in (Thamrin
et al., 2008) works with the same kind of intermediate sig-
nal. It uses polarized photons combined with a fast clock
sampling method (Fig. 2). The value of a counter is mea-
sured with the falling edge of a signal with its transitions
controlled by two spatially separated detectors, although
there seems to be no post-processing to avoid correlation
in the most significant bits. The generator in (Stipcˇevic´
and Bowers, 2015) combines a branching path configura-
tion at a beam splitter with the time difference method.
There is one random bit associated to the detector that
finds the photon and a bit associated to the difference
between times of arrival at the detectors. The generator
combines both bits to provide a random stream without
the biases of the two independent generation methods.
D. Photon counting generators
Another large group of generators based on time effects
use the number of registered detections in a fixed time T .
For an exponential time random variable, the number of
photons that arrive in a fixed time T follows a Poisson
distribution. The probability of finding n photons in that
interval is
P (n) =
(λT )n
n!
e−λT . (17)
For instance, the generator in (Fu¨rst et al., 2010) fol-
lows an approach similar to the radioactive decay genera-
tor of (Schmidt, 1970b) (see Figure 3) and generates bits
from the parity of the total counts registered in a fixed
period. The source of light is an LED and, as in many
other time-based QRNG, the authors turn to PMTs for
faster detection. Interestingly, the generator takes ad-
vantage of the dead time of the detector. For the par-
ity method, the random variable that describes the true
rate of photocounts when the detector has a small dead
time gives a smaller final bias when compared to a pure
Poisson process. This approach of taking the least signif-
icant bit of the photon count is also followed in (Lopes
Soares et al., 2014), where thermal and weak coherent
state sources are compared.
Certain generators use an approach similar to the time
difference comparisons of the previous section. If the first
measurement gives n1 photons and there are n2 photons
in the next time bin, we can generate a 1 when n1 > n2
and a 0 if n1 < n2 (Ren et al., 2011).
With these methods we are generating just one bit for
each measurement. But, depending on λT , our measure-
ments can have a higher entropy. There are some ways
to take a fuller advantage of the data we already have.
Certain generators assign more than one bit per de-
tection depending on the counted photon number. The
possible results are grouped into sets with equal total
probability, which usually requires adjusting the mean
photon level of the source to make sure all the sets are
really equally, or almost equally, likely (Jian et al., 2011).
Depending on the exact photon rate λT in the observed
period T , the second, third or further least significant bits
of the number of counted photons might also be uniform.
This is taken into account dynamically in the generator
of (Tisa et al., 2015) which has an array of integrated
CMOS SPAD detectors that receive light from an LED
to generate random numbers in parallel in a 32× 32 de-
tector matrix. This is the principle behind the commer-
cial generator of Micro Photon Devices (MPD, 2014). In
this approach it is important to properly characterize the
dead time, as the rate that registers at the detector λdet
is affected by dead time. The corrected rate
λdet =
λ
1 + λ tdead
T
(18)
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helps to adjust the choice of how many bits from the
counted number of photons should be used.
There are also generators that use everyday devices.
Certain commercial cameras that are not designed for
quantum detection can, nevertheless, offer good enough
precision for quantum random number generation. There
have been demonstrations of random numbers generated
on a mobile phone (Sanguinetti et al., 2014) from the
variations in the count statistic of a state with around 410
photons. In that implementation, the results are taken
to a randomness extractor to eliminate correlations and
noise effects. This approach is related to the shot noise
generators of Section VII.F.
Other photon counting methods take bins of length T ,
subdivide them into smaller bins where we are likely to
have zero or one photons and then use more involved
procedures to convert the non-uniform Poisson statistics
of the large bin into a uniform random variable (Wang
et al., 2015a,b; Yan et al., 2015).
E. Attenuated pulse generators
Certain generators are based on a simplified version
of the previous methods with more relaxed requirements
for the detectors. Most current single photon detectors
have a limited photon number resolving capability and
have a binary response of click (one or more photons
are detected) or no click (no photon has been found).
Photon counting methods usually rely on multiple clicks
in a long time period that is divided into a concatenation
of smaller bins in the time resolution of the detector.
These methods assume a weak source that produces zero
or one photons in that bin and that there is a small or
ideally negligible probability of generating two or more
photons in that shorter time period.
We call an attenuated pulse generator to the OQRNG
with a weak source that has the same probability of gen-
erating a photon or not. More precisely, we require the
complete system to give a detection probability of one
half. We can imagine a superposition of the empty and
single photon states in the same spatio-temporal mode
(the path that goes to a certain detector in a certain
time) so that the quantum state of our photon pulse is
|0〉1 + |1〉1√
2
. (19)
We can associate a 0 to a no-detection event and a 1 to a
click. The occupied state does not need to have exactly
one photon. Any superposition
1√
2
|0〉1 +
∞∑
k=1
αk |k〉1 (20)
with
∑∞
k=1 |αk|2 = 12 is valid. Externally, we just take
the 1s from clicks and do not care if they are triggered
by one or more photons.
Coherent states provide such a superposition and are
easy to produce. For a coherent state of amplitude α the
probability of finding zero photons is
p(n = 0) = e−|α|
2
(21)
and the complementary probability of finding one or more
photons (and finding a click in the detector) is
p(n ≥ 1) = (1 − e−|α|2), (22)
as can be seen from Eq. (11). The simplest idea would
be to find the α for which p(n = 0) = p(n ≥ 1), which
happens for α =
√
ln 2. Eq. (17) shows any Poissonian
source with λT = ln 2 ≈ 0.693 also gives the desired
detector probability.
In practice, the generator works with an effective mean
photon number at the detector ηλT , with an efficiency η
that depends on many factors such as detector efficiency
or path losses. The OQRNG can be adjusted by fine
tuning of a variable attenuator. This is the model of the
generator in (Wei and Guo, 2009a). Alternatively, the
generator can act on the light source. The OQRNG in
(Bisadi et al., 2015a,b) adjusts the current of an LED
in order to have the desired balance. The OQRNG of
(Stipcˇevic´ and Ursin, 2015) also has an adjustable source
to guarantee a 50% probability of detection, this time
inside an on-demand circuit that produces the photon
pulses after a trigger signal has arrived.
Even after tuning, there can be residual bias and the
system can drift out of the tuned state during operation.
The generator in (Wei and Guo, 2009b) uses von Neu-
mann extraction to address the problem (see Section X).
For two detections with photon numbers n1 and n2, it
outputs a 1 if n1 > 0 and n2 = 0 (a click followed by
an empty pulse) and a 0 if n1 = 0 and n2 > 1 (no click
followed by a detection). The results with two successive
empty pulses or two successive clicks are discarded. For a
Poissonian source, both bit values are equally likely with
a probability P (n > 0)P (n = 0) = e−ηλT (1 − e−ηλT ).
The resulting bit rate is at least four times slower, but
free from bias. Greater biases result in smaller rates, but
the bits still present balanced probabilities.
F. Generators based on quantum vacuum fluctuations
Another group of quantum generators exploits the fluc-
tuations in the quantum vacuum state. The vacuum state
can be written as a superposition of amplitude quadra-
ture states |x〉
|0〉 =
∫ ∞
−∞
ψ(x) |x〉 dx, (23)
where ψ(x) is the ground-state wavefunction. The wave-
function is a Gaussian around x = 0 so that
|ψ(x)|2 = 1√
π
e−x
2
. (24)
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Homodyne measurement (Collett et al., 1987) offers a
simple way to measure the X quadrature. The balanced
homodyne detection scheme of Fig. 8 has an output
proportional to the quadrature amplitude of the vacuum
field and gives an amplified reading of the basic uncer-
tainty in the vacuum state.
Vacuum
LO
-
FIG. 8 Homodyne measurement of the vacuum: A laser act-
ing as a local oscillator, LO, is mixed with the vacuum state
in a balanced beam splitter. The readings of two detectors at
the output of the beam splitter are subtracted and processed
to give a current output proportional to the X quadrature of
the vacuum field. The proportionality constant is a function
of the reference field in the local oscillator.
The homodyne detector mixes the vacuum state with
a reference laser field from a local oscillator and sub-
tracts the current measurements of two amplitude de-
tectors. The resulting signal can then be processed and
digitized to produce the random numbers. Depending
on the digitizer that receives the values from the optical
detectors, the choice of the local oscillator, the detectors’
bandwidth, noise factors and other problems, we might
have a different amount of available random bits. With
an adequate treatment, the uncertainty in the final mea-
surement can be mostly attributed to the intrinsic quan-
tum fluctuations of the observed vacuum state and not
to the shot noise from the local oscillator or other noise
sources (Yuen and Chan, 1983). This random signal can
be digitized and sent to a comparator or an entropy ex-
traction circuit to produce random sequences (Trifonov
and Vig, 2007). The generator in (Shen et al., 2010) im-
plements this method by sampling the filtered shot-noise
signal periodically and taking the last bit of its digitized
amplitude.
We can also take the quadrature measurement, divide
the range of possible values of x into boxes from xi to
xi+1 and then assign to each box different random bit
values. The continuous quadrature value x is in box i
with a probability ∫ xi+1
xi
|ψ(x)|2dx. (25)
The QRNG of (Gabriel et al., 2010) implements this
method. It takes 5 bits per measurement (32 bins) and
hashes the resulting sequence to remove residual correla-
tions.
QRNGs that measure the vacuum fluctuations can go
beyond the Mbps rates of single photon detection meth-
ods and reach rates in the Gbps range. They can use
fast classical detectors and we can optimize the speed of
the electronic part of the generator and concentrate on
reducing the technical noise, like the generator of (Symul
et al., 2011), which discards the least significant bits as
a fast method of randomness extraction after noticing
that the most significant bits of the digitized homodyne
measurement carry most of the quantum noise.
The method can also be used with the squeezed vac-
uum state. The generator of (Zhu et al., 2012) uses sec-
ond harmonic generation in a parametric oscillator with
no input signal to produce a squeezed vacuum state that
presents a larger uncertainty in the measured quadrature.
In the squeezed vacuum state, the Gaussian wavefunction
|ψ(x)|2 =
√
s
π
e−sx
2
(26)
is wider by a squeezing parameter 0 < s < 1. Homo-
dyne measurement produces a larger range of voltages
and makes conversion to digital strings easier. We can
define more voltage ranges and reduce the effects of classi-
cal noise. With more squeezing (a smaller s) the entropy
due to quantum noise increases and the bit rate after
randomness extraction can be higher. The generation of
squeezed vacuum states is described in more detail in Sec-
tion VII.J in relation to QRNGs with optical parametric
oscillators.
G. Generators based on the phase noise of lasers
The output of a laser has a random phase of quantum
origin that can be used to produce random bits. Inside
the cavity of a single-mode semiconductor laser, spon-
taneous emission causes fluctuations in the output field
(Henry, 1982). This phase noise, also known as phase dif-
fusion, comes from a combination of different quantum
effects6. Direct phase measurement is not technologi-
cally feasible for optical signals, but an unbalanced Mach-
Zehnder interferometer, MZI, (see Fig. 9) can translate
phase differences into amplitude variations.
6 There are many opposing views on the exact role of the vac-
uum fluctuations and spontaneous emission in laser phase noise
and whether spontaneous emission is a direct manifestation of
vacuum fluctuations or not (Fain, 1982; Gea-Banacloche et al.,
1988; Ginzburg, 1983; Henry and Kazarinov, 1996; Scully and
Stenholm, 1988). As far as quantum random number generators
are concerned, the exact nature of phase noise is not relevant as
long as it is a quantum effect that can produce an observable
with a known distribution.
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In an unbalanced MZI one of the arms introduces a
delay τ with respect to the other arm. Assuming a con-
stant or slowly varying amplitude in each arm, the out-
put has a constant level and a variation proportional
to cos(φ(t) − φ(t + τ)) for a random phase difference
∆φ(t) = φ(t) − φ(t + τ). The amplitude at the output
ports of the interferometer can be measured with high
speed standard optical detectors.
If the introduced delay is far above the coherence time
of the laser7, τ ≫ τcoh, the phase difference ∆φ(t) is a
Gaussian random variable of a mean that tends to 0 (Lax,
1967). If we sample the amplitude of the detector with a
time difference between samples ∆t ≫ τ + τcoh, the re-
sulting amplitudes are independent (Guo et al., 2010; Qi
et al., 2010). These amplitudes are the random variable
in many OQRNGs. While the voltages at the detectors
carry many classical sources of noise, the quantum phase
noise is known to be inversely proportional to the laser
output power (Henry, 1982) and, if we operate the laser
at a low intensity close the lasing threshold, we can make
the quantum uncertainty the dominant noise.
Sampling
processing
and
Delay τ
FIG. 9 If we divide the light coming from a laser in a beam
splitter and make it interfere with a delayed version of itself,
the quantum phase noise will produce a random amplitude at
the output. Choosing an adequate delay and sampling rate,
we can process these amplitudes to generate random numbers.
The generators in (Guo et al., 2010; Qi et al., 2010)
use the basic configuration in Fig. 9 and sample at a
fixed period the voltage in one of the detectors. After
processing, the voltages Vk measured at times tk = t0 +
k∆t are independent Gaussian random variables.
To generate the random bits, the OQRNG of (Guo
et al., 2010) takes the least significant bit of the voltage
measurement or the least significant bit from the differ-
ence Vk+1−Vk between two results if we want to remove
biases from the digitization of the voltage amplitudes.
The generator in (Qi et al., 2010) adds a phase com-
pensation system in the interferometer to avoid classi-
cal phase drift effects that might mask the quantum sig-
nal. Its random bits come from comparing each measured
7 For semiconductor laser with a linewidth ∆νlas we can determine
a coherence time τcoh =
1
pi∆νlas
(Henry, 1982).
voltage with a threshold at the mean voltage value 0. For
the Gaussian voltage signal of interest, we can produce
random bits if we choose an output 1 for Vk > 0 and a 0
for Vk < 0.
The voltage distribution is Gaussian and we cannot
directly use all the digitized bits, which are correlated.
However, we can feed them to a randomness extraction
algorithm to generate uncorrelated bits. This is the ap-
proach of the generators of (Liu et al., 2010b) and (Xu
et al., 2012) which use the same optical delay circuit as
the previous implementations and the generator of (Nie
et al., 2015), which uses a modified interferometer with
advanced phase drift correction to achieve rates of tens of
Gbps. We can also use Faraday mirrors to correct phase
jitter (Zhu et al., 2011).
For all these generators, we can try to maximize the
rate either by increasing the sampling rate or the number
of bits we take. However, faster sampling means higher
correlations and digitizers have a limited precision. For
any given system the randomness rate can be optimized
by acting on the sampling rate (Zhou et al., 2015). In-
creasing the sampling rate increases the generated ran-
dom bit rate until ∆t = τ . After that point, the bits
we read have a higher correlation. The additional sam-
ples produce a smaller number of uniform bits and the
overall speed decreases. We should choose a delay that
maximizes the final bit rate
Rs = − 1
τ
log2
[
2Φ
(
λ√
τ
)
− 1
]
, (27)
for a parameter λ that depends on the laser power, the
length of the measured voltage interval and other con-
stants of our system. Φ(x) is the cumulative distribution
function of the standard Gaussian distribution.
An interesting alternative implementation of phase
noise quantum random number generators uses pulsed
lasers to avoid phase correlations in the optical field. In
the generator demonstrated in (Jofre et al., 2011), a laser
is driven by short pulses that take it rapidly from below
the threshold to lasing levels. The time the laser is below
the threshold, any previous coherence is attenuated and
amplified spontaneous emission introduces a new random
field. When the laser is suddenly taken above threshold,
it amplifies the cavity field to a classical level. After the
short amplification stage, the resulting field has a known
amplitude due to gain saturation, but the phase is ran-
dom.
The resulting output has a series of pulses with a ran-
dom phase. The phase is converted into amplitude with
the usual unbalanced Mach Zehnder interferometer, this
time with a delay τ that matches the repetition rate at
the laser so that two consecutive pulses interfere at the
output beam splitter (Fig. 10).
The phase of each pulse φi is uniformly random in
[−π, π) and so is the phase different between neighbour-
ing pulses. The interferometer converts the phase into
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FIG. 10 Using a pulsed laser we can generate individual
pulses with a random phase due to quantum phase noise. If
we introduce a delay in one arm of an interferometer, we have
the interference of two pulses with independent phases and
the output will have a random amplitude.
an amplitude variation that, after detection and filtering,
provides energy measurements that are almost uniformly
distributed in a restricted range.
The same configuration with a pulsed laser has been re-
fined later adding passive phase compensation to reduce
classical phase drift (Tang et al., 2013) and tuning the
system to achieve a faster rate up to 43 Gbps (Abella´n
et al., 2014).
Quantum noise inside semiconductor lasers plays also
a role in classical random number generators based on
chaos. There have appeared many random number gen-
erators that have one or more semiconductor lasers with
optical feedback. The lasers produce a chaotic signal
with pulses of a random amplitude and time position
(Hirano et al., 2010; Kanter et al., 2010; Reidler et al.,
2009; Uchida et al., 2008). Quantum noise in the laser
is the origin of a random variation in the cavity that is
then amplified in a chaotic process. While these genera-
tors have some entropy due to quantum effects, most of
the unpredictability of the final sequence rests on chaotic
evolution, which is deterministic. In a sense, they work
as physical pseudorandom number generators that take
a random quantum seed and expand these small fluctua-
tions at the quantum level into a fast changing physical
process to achieve generation rates up to hundreds of
Gbps.
H. Generators based on amplified spontaneous emission
Fiber communication systems owe their fast long range
data rates to optical amplification. There are different
technologies for optical amplification, like erbium-doped
fiber amplifiers, EDFAs, and semiconductor optical am-
plifiers, SOAs, both popular alternatives in optical com-
munication systems. These optical amplifiers work on
variations of the same principle: the light is directed into
a medium with population inversion so that the photons
in the signal stimulate the coherent emission of new pho-
tons that increase the signal’s power. However, any ex-
cited medium capable of stimulated emission also shows
spontaneous emission. That means there appear spon-
taneously emitted photons inside the gain medium that
are amplified by stimulated emission just like the signal
is. The random quantum phenomenon of spontaneous
emission is thus amplified to a measurable signal with a
random amplitude.
This noise, known as amplified spontaneous emission,
ASE, noise is a major limitation to optical gain in com-
munication systems. Larger gains introduce larger noise
powers and there is a maximum amplification that can
be obtained without degrading the signal-to-noise ratio.
Amplified spontaneous emission, either alone or in its
beats with the signal or itself, is a strong source of noise
that dominates over thermal noise in the detector or the
optical shot noise. ASE noise is a first rate challenge in
optical communication systems, but can be turned into a
good source of entropy in quantum random number gen-
erators. Amplified spontaneous emission gives a readily
available strong signal with a quantum origin that can be
measured with existing optical equipment at fast rates.
Sampling random amplitudes of the ASE field in different
frequency bands gives statistically independent random
variables, even at high sampling rates. The rate of change
is usually much faster than the detection mechanism and
the speed of the detectors is the limiting factor to the rate
in most QRNGs that sample ASE noise. These devices
can achieve generation rates of Gbps.
The first proposed quantum random number gener-
ators using amplified spontaneous emission work with
commercial equipment from optical fiber communica-
tions. The generator of (Williams et al., 2010) uses as
a source of random light a pumped erbium/ytterbium
co-doped fiber with no input that generates photons by
spontaneous emission and amplifies them on their way to
a processing stage with a bandpass filter and a second low
noise amplifier. The filter limits the signal in the detec-
tor to help it work correctly. The signal is then split into
its two polarization components, which are independent,
and sent to two square-law photodetectors. The result-
ing voltage signal is mostly what is known as ASE-ASE
beat noise, a signal of a random amplitude, with some
residual noise from other sources. These voltages have
a known distribution that depends on the shape of the
filter. The difference of the voltages is a random variable
of mean 0. The random bits come from comparing the
voltages after each detector v1(t) and v2(t), generating
a 1 when v1(ti) > v2(ti) at the sampling time ti and a
0 otherwise. The resulting sequence still has some small
correlation between bits. To correct that, the generator
outputs the exclusive OR of the raw bit sequence with a
delayed version of itself.
The generator in (Martin et al., 2015) also uses a fil-
tered ASE source, a back-pumped erbium doped fiber,
but, instead of two detectors, it works with direct de-
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tection in a single avalanche photodiode. For the cho-
sen filter, the spectral bandwidth of the optical signal is
larger than the detector bandwidth by a factor of m. In
that case, the intensity distribution that gives the prob-
ability of finding n photons for a source with an average
of λ photons in the time of detection (the inverse of the
detection bandwidth) is (Wong et al., 1998)
pBE(n, λ,m) =
Γ(n+m)
Γ(n+ 1)Γ(m)
(
1 +
1
λ
)−n
(1 + λ)−m.
(28)
For a high enough value of n and m, the distribution has
a large standard deviation and most of the uncertainty
in the measured voltage comes from the ASE noise and
not from electrical noise. We can generate random num-
bers comparing the results to a threshold value that gives
equal probabilities for values below and above it (0 for
values below the threshold, 1 for values above). The nec-
essary threshold can vary during operation due to power
changes in the source or a drift in environmental condi-
tions during the time of generation. The resulting bias
can be corrected with a randomness extractor.
Each measurement can give more than one random
bit. The quantum random number generator in (Argyris
et al., 2012) also uses a single detector but extracts the
random bits from a statistical analysis of the random
distribution of the detected voltage. The device gener-
ates amplified spontaneous emission in two different im-
plementations, one with an erbium-doped fiber amplifier
and another with a semiconductor optical amplifier. In
both cases, the signal is directed to an optical attenuator.
The whole unfiltered noise signal reaches the photodetec-
tor where the noise beats give a Gaussian voltage distri-
bution that is digitized. Discarding the few first most
significant bits gives a good quality random signal.
Another group of QRNGs uses superluminescent LEDs
as the light source. Superluminescent light diodes are in-
coherent semiconductor sources with internal optical gain
that offer an alternative broadband source of ASE. Their
output shows a flat spectrum in a wide frequency range.
The noise in separate parts of the spectrum is indepen-
dent and can be used to increase the random bit rate.
The generator of (Li et al., 2011) can generate multi-
ple bit streams using a wavelength multiplexed configu-
ration where the light from the superluminescent diode
is divided into many channels with bandpass filters for
different frequency bands. Each channel ends in a sin-
gle detector whose output is compared to a threshold to
generate the random bits. Each output is then processed
by taking the XOR of the bit sequence with a delayed
version of itself. The experiment in the paper is for a
two channel system, but the method can be extended to
multiple parallel streams.
The QRNG in (Li et al., 2014) also uses a superlu-
minescent diode in a refined version of the comparison
method in (Williams et al., 2010). The filtered ASE noise
from the diode is amplified in an EDFA and taken to a
balanced detection scheme where the optical output is
split in two parts and sent to two detectors, one of which
receives a delayed signal. This self-differencing takes part
of the processing to the optical signal and gives a more
symmetric voltage distribution for which it is easier to
define a threshold at voltage 0.
As in other generators, we can also try and use all the
samples of the digitized voltage and then use postprocess-
ing with delayed versions of the signal to remove residual
correlations (Yamazaki and Uchida, 2013). In that case,
the final bit rate can be improved by over-sampling. If
we use a sampling rate above the spectrum linewidth of
the detected noise, which is limited by the detector, the
resulting bits are correlated, but adequate postprocessing
can restore a good quality sequence (Liu et al., 2013).
A curious alternative is the RNG of (Wei et al., 2010)
that uses the spontaneous emission from a regular light
emitting diode without amplification. With no ampli-
fier, the random directions of emission of an LED makes
detection difficult. In order to collect enough light, the
light source and the detector are placed in the focal points
of an ellipsoidal cavity so that the emitted light is col-
lected into the photodiode’s sensitive area. The ampli-
tude fluctuations due to the randomness in the emission
times come from many independent events and tend to
a Gaussian distribution. The voltage at the detector is
then sampled and the bits from the digitizer are unbiased
to give a random bit string at the output.
I. Generators based on Raman scattering
The interaction between photons and the quantum vi-
brational states of certain materials is also a good source
of randomness. Some quantum RNG resort to Raman
scattering phenomena to obtain the entropy for random
bit generation.
There are two important Raman scattering effects.
The first is spontaneous Raman scattering. In sponta-
neous Raman scattering, SpRS, a photon is scattered
when it interacts with a molecular lattice that absorbs
or creates a phonon to produce a new photon of a higher
or lower frequency. If the scattered photon has a larger
wavelength and the energy difference is converted into a
phonon we speak of a Stokes photon and when there is
an energy gain and an incoming photon and an existing
phonon produce a scattered photon of a smaller wave-
length we speak of an anti-Stokes photon. Anti-Stokes
transitions usually produce a smaller field, as they need
an established phonon population of the right excited
levels of the medium, which in thermal equilibrium is
smaller than the population of the ground state (Boyd,
2008).
Another Raman effect is stimulated Raman scatter-
ing, SRS. In stimulated Raman scattering a photon of
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the frequency ωS corresponding to the energy difference
between a pump photon and the matching phonon in a
spontaneous Raman scattering event stimulates the pro-
duction of a new photon of the same frequency ωS . This
process can be used to obtain optical amplification. If
we have a strong optical pump and a signal at the fre-
quency ωS, the photons of the signal stimulate the emis-
sion of new photons that join the signal pulse consuming
phonons and the photons from the pump. This mech-
anism is used in many photonic devices for amplifica-
tion and wavelength conversion (Islam, 2002; Jalali et al.,
2006) as well as in multiple applications in spectroscopy
(Colthup et al., 1990). While SpRS is almost isotropic
and happens at many frequencies, the resulting field in
stimulated Raman scattering is mostly contained in a
narrow spatial direction and consists primarily of Stokes
photons (Boyd, 2008).
Some of the QRNGs based on Raman scattering work
on principles similar to those of the amplified sponta-
neous emission noise generators of Section VII.H, but, in-
stead of employing quantum spontaneous emission events
that are amplified through stimulated emission, they
have a strong pump with no input signal so that the spon-
taneous Raman scattering photons that are produced at
random from quantum noise are amplified in a stimulated
Raman scattering process (Penzkofer et al., 1979). The
process starts from spontaneous emission to the Stokes
field that comes from the fluctuations of the phonon field
(Raymer and Walmsley, 1990). The spontaneously gen-
erated photons induce new Raman scattering processes
and the field is amplified to a macroscopic level in what
is known as spontaneously initiated stimulated Raman
scattering, SISRS. The quantum fluctuations at the ini-
tiating process show at the output field as an uncertainty
in the optical phase (Belsley et al., 1993; Kuo et al., 1991;
Smithey et al., 1991) and amplitude (photon number)
(Raymer et al., 1982; Walmsley and Raymer, 1983).
The first proposal for random number generation with
stimulated Raman scattering (Bustard et al., 2011) is
based on measurement of the random phase in the field
out of an optically pumped diamond (Figure 11). Dia-
monds are a good material for Raman experiments due
to their high Raman gain and their transparency at a
wide range of wavelengths. A pulsed laser signal is fo-
cused into the diamond and produces a Stokes field with
a random phase that is uniformly random in the [0, 2π)
range. An optical bandpass filter takes away the pump,
which is in a different frequency band than the Stokes
field. The random phases are converted into interfer-
ence patterns at a CCD camera by combining the Stokes
field and a reference pulse in a beam splitter. The beam
splitter is tilted so that there appear intensity fringes at
the detector. The random phase is recovered by fitting
the interference pattern to a cosine model and then it is
assigned to a bin out of 64 possible phase ranges. The re-
sulting 6 bits are then taken to a bit extraction algorithm
to remove any remaining bias.
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FIG. 11 Generation of random numbers based on Raman
scattering by measuring the phase in the field out of a pumped
diamond. In this method, the phase is measured using the
interference pattern of the scattered field and a reference. The
pattern comes from a tilted beam splitter.
The random fluctuations in the amplitude of the field
permit a simpler detection scheme without phase to am-
plitude conversion. Direct detection gives a straight-
forward amplitude measurement. There is, however, a
new problem. Power fluctuations in the pump pulses can
mask the quantum effect we want to measure. The gen-
erator in (Bustard et al., 2013) monitors the pump power
to solve this problem (see Figure 11). The basic setup is
essentially the same as in the phase Raman random num-
ber generator we have just covered. The pump starts an
SIRS process in a diamond and the Stokes field is filtered
from the pump background. Now we can directly use a
detector with the output field. During normal operation,
the amplitude fluctuations can reach up to multiple times
the mean energy. The exact amplitude distribution has
no known analytic expression and depends on the Raman
gain, the focusing geometry and the effects of phonon
decay, among others (Raymer et al., 1985). The output
field has also small contributions due to pump coupling
to more than one spatial mode and other masking ef-
fects. The amount of available entropy can be estimated
deconvolving the Stokes energy distribution from the de-
tection noise, as measured without a signal. The results
show only a small effect of electrical detection in the to-
tal noise. In order to extract the entropy, the measured
intensity values are corrected with the power values of
the monitored reference and the compensated amplitude
measurements are binned into intensity ranges that are
assigned a bit string. As a last step, the sequence is ap-
plied Toeplitz hashing to remove bias and classical noise.
In both cases we have described, Raman interaction
has a potential for fast generation rates. The system
dephases in times of the order of a few picoseconds, re-
setting the vacuum phonon state before the new random
field is generated. The pulses come with a period much
longer than the dephasing time for the phonons in the
diamond. In these random number generators, the rate
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FIG. 12 We can use the amplitude fluctuations in Raman
scattering as a randomness source. In order to correct for
the fluctuations of the pump, which do not have a quantum
origin, we must include an amplitude correction method.
limit comes from the repetition rate of the laser. Stim-
ulated Raman scattering requires large powers in order
to produce a strong output signal. In the free-space con-
figuration of the discussed generators the available lasers
limited the rate to the range of kbps. These rates can be
improved with faster lasers.
An alternative way to measure phase differences with
a higher rate is given in (England et al., 2014), where Ra-
man interaction happens inside a highly nonlinear Potas-
sium Titanyl Phosphate, KTiOPO4, waveguide. Wave-
guides offer tight confinement and the guided pump field
has a stronger interaction with the medium that allows
us to use power levels in the range of faster repetition
lasers, like the titanium:sapphire oscillator with a rep-
etition rate of 80 MHz of this generator. The random
numbers come from converting the random phase into an
amplitude variation in an interferometer with a delayed
arm, like in the schemes for quantum random number
generators based on phase noise we discussed in Section
VII.G.
The quantum effects in spontaneous Raman scattering,
SpRS, can also serve as a randomness source in schemes
without amplification at the cost of adding single pho-
ton detectors. By improving the detector, we can have
a continuous wave laser pump of relatively low power.
If we only observe the scattered photons with large fre-
quency shifts, this interaction is mostly between the in-
put photons and the vacuum noise phonon fluctuations
instead of interactions with the thermal phonon field.
The quantum randomness from phonon vacuum fluctua-
tions is the principle behind the QRNG of (Collins et al.,
2015, 2014) where a strong pump inside a highly nonlin-
ear As2S3 fiber generates spontaneous Raman photons
in different frequency bands. The pump photons inter-
act with phonons of different energies. The scattered
photons occupy the spectrum following a known proba-
bility distribution with two separate regions. One part
of the spectrum is associated to thermal phonons and, in
a time T , it has an expected scattered photon detection
rate (Collins et al., 2015; Kobliska and Solin, 1973; Lin
et al., 2007)
R(ν, T ) = Cη∆νPL(1 + nBE(ν, T ))g(ν) (29)
that depends on different experimental parameters like
the Raman coupling efficiency C, the experimental loss
factor η, the measurement bandwidth ∆ν, the laser
power P or the effective scattering length of the device
L. Two particularly interesting factors are the gain pro-
file of the medium with frequency g(ν), which includes
both polarizations, and the thermal phonon occupation
number
nBE(ν, T ) =
1
e
hν
kBT − 1
(30)
that gives the Bose-Einstein distribution of the popula-
tion of phonons with energy hν for a thermal energy kBT .
This distribution is close to the smaller detunings with re-
spect to the pump. The photon distribution in frequency
is concentrated a few THz above the pump frequency.
The spectrum has a second peak at higher detunings
due to the quantum vacuum fluctuations of the phonon
field. In the discussed As2S3 fiber, the distribution peaks
around 10.4 THz above the pump (Collins et al., 2012).
At room temperature, the distributions of quantum and
thermal origin are centered around different parts of the
spectrum. While both distributions are random, the
thermal component shows the same problems as the ther-
mal noise generators we discussed in Section VI and
we prefer the more stable random distribution from the
quantum part of the spectrum. There is still some contri-
bution from thermal scattering events, but this and other
biases can be corrected with postprocessing.
Once we have selected the most adequate frequencies,
we can use a coarse wavelength division multiplexer to
measure two slices of the spectrum with an equal prob-
ability of having a spontaneously scattered photon. The
multiplexer converts the spectrum distribution into a
spatial separation. The rest of the scheme basically fol-
lows the model of the spatial separation generators we
discussed in Section VII.B. In the discussed experiments,
two detectors D0 and D1 measure the photons in the
paths of the two spectrum slices during a time T . The
output bit is a 0 if there is a click only in D0 and a 1 if
only D1 clicks. Two simultaneous detections and empty
time bins are discarded. The differences in the collection
efficiencies of the two detector channels and the non-flat
shape of the Raman spectrum introduces biases in the
sequence. In order to correct the bias, there is a post-
processing stage that XORs the sequence with a 16-bit
delayed version of itself.
The experiment gave raw generation rates of 1 Mbps,
650 kbps after postprocessing. The ultimate limit for
the random bit generation rate depends on the decay
time of the Raman response function. Spontaneous Ra-
man scattering photons that are generated with a time
separation less than the Raman response time can have
frequency correlations. The photon generation rate can
be controlled with the power of the pump laser to avoid
correlations. In the studied fiber, the medium reacts in
less than 100 fs (Asobe et al., 1995). Generation rates up
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to 1 GHz would still show a small two photon probability
of the order of 5× 10−3 in that response interval.
In the experiment, the generation rate is limited by the
detectors. The detector limitations are the same as in the
generators based on single photon detection we discussed
in Sections VII.B and VII.C. Most single photon detec-
tors are limited to a MHz rate, but more advanced detec-
tor technologies can bring the rate closer to the Raman
physical limit. Additionally, the rates can be improved
by dividing the spectrum into more than two channels.
A wavelength division multiplexer can take the photons
into multiple paths that allow to extract more than one
bit per measurement.
J. Generators based on optical parametric oscillators
Binary phase selection in degenerate optical paramet-
ric oscillators offers a further way to amplify quantum
randomness from the microscopic level to a macroscopic
optical field. In an optical parametric oscillator, OPO,
the photons that appear from spontaneous parametric
down conversion of the light from a pump start an os-
cillation inside a cavity, even without any input at the
resonant lower frequencies (Harris et al., 1967; Louisell
et al., 1961). The zero-point fluctuations alone can ini-
tiate the gain in the cavity. The principle is similar to
the amplification of quantum noise inside a laser we have
discussed in Section VII.G.
In spontaneous parametric down conversion, the non-
linear response of a medium converts the photons from a
pump at a frequency ωp into two photons: a signal pho-
ton with frequency ωs and an idler photon at ωi so that
ωp = ωs + ωi. This phenomenon has applications in en-
tanglement generation and in parametric amplifiers. In
a medium with type I degenerate down conversion each
photon from the pump produces two photons with the
same frequency and polarization. Different pump pho-
tons give different polarizations, but all the generated
photons have the same frequency. In these conditions,
an optical parametric oscillator with no input but the
pump amplifies the uncertainty in the vacuum fluctua-
tions and the output is a squeezed vacuum state where
the uncertainty at the quantum level can be measured
from a macroscopic optical signal (Wu et al., 1986, 1987).
The cavity of an optical parametric oscillator has losses
and there is a gain threshold below which spontaneous
parametric down conversion cannot be amplified to the
macroscopic level (Yariv and Yeh, 2007). In a continuous
wave type I degenerate OPO where both the signal and
the idler fields are indistinguishable, the gain mechanism
is phase dependent and has a period of π for the signal
phase (Marandi et al., 2012a; Nabors et al., 1990). For
an adequate pumping power, there are only two stable
oscillation states where the gain is greater than the os-
cillator losses. These states show a phase with respect to
the pump around θs = 0 in one state and around θs = π
in the other.
The optical parametric oscillator quantum random
number generators of (Marandi et al., 2011, 2012b) use
as their randomness source the phase of the macroscopic
field inside the cavity, which is inherited from the vac-
uum fluctuations. In this process, classical noise effects
are negligible and do not change the phase state. In or-
der to convert the phase variations into a binary random
number, we can take two independent cavities of the same
output power and make their output fields interfere at a
beam splitter. If both cavities have a state around the
same phase, there will be a constructive interference and
the signal will have close to double the original power.
If the phase states are around opposite values there is a
destructive interference and the output power is close to
0.
OPO2
OPO1
1 1 10 0 01
Vacuum fluctuations
Vacuum fluctuations
Bit sequence
Switch
FIG. 13 Quantum random number generation with two op-
tical parametric oscillators. A pulsed laser creates an oscil-
lation in each OPO in one out of two possible stable states
with a phase centered around 0 or pi with respect to the pump.
The final stable phase depends on the initial conditions of the
quantum fluctuations in the cavity and when the pulses from
both OPOs interfere we will have close to totally destructive
or close to totally constructive interference. The resulting
amplitudes can be easily distinguished and be assigned to the
0 and 1 bit values.
For the right cavity parameters, the phase distribution
can be quite narrow around the central values θs = 0 and
θs = π and the output power of the interferometer has
two clearly distinguishable optical power values that can
be told apart using a threshold in the middle of the ex-
pected detector voltages corresponding to a totally con-
structive interference and a totally destructive one. The
value of the comparison can be used to generate random
bits. A low voltage state (destructive interference) can be
interpreted as a 0 and a high voltage state (constructive
interference) as 1.
The bit rate depends on the time it takes for the cavity
to generate a new random phase. Once a stable state is
established inside the cavity, it will feed itself. We need to
restart the oscillation to generate a new random value. In
the generator of (Marandi et al., 2011, 2012b) the cavity
is detuned by blocking and unblocking the pump.
There is a minimum time before we have a fresh source
of randomness. We must first allow the field inside the
cavity to decay to the quantum noise level before a new
oscillation builds up. Otherwise, when we establish the
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oscillation, the residual field dominates over quantum
fluctuations and the new phase state is correlated to the
previous phase value. This is the limiting factor in the
speed of OPO-based QRNGs. The exact time for regen-
eration depends on the cavity and the pump power. If
we pump well above threshold, like in the described gen-
erators, it can take from 10 to 20 times the 1/e decay
time of the cavity to go back to the quantum noise level
(Marandi et al., 2012b). The intensity decay time can be
estimated from the oscillator parameters as
τoff =
T
2δE − 2δE
√
Poff
Pth
(31)
for a cavity with an electric field fractional roundtrip loss
δE , a cavity roundtrip time T and pump powers at the
threshold and “off” levels of Pth and Poff respectively
(Marandi et al., 2012b).
In the described QRNGs the bit rate is in the order of
tens of kbps before serious correlation problems appear.
Shorter cavities can have lower build-up times and, when
combined with pumps at higher repetition rates, would
allow rates in the Gbps range (Lecomte et al., 2005).
There are also interesting variations of the method
with other parametric processes. This generation method
is not necessarily restricted to second-order nonlinear ma-
terials. Instead, we could use χ(3) effects in integrated
optical parametric oscillators (Liu et al., 2010a; Razzari
et al., 2010).
Apart from optical parametric oscillators, there are
other bistable optical systems where quantum effects can
produce jumps between stable states. For instance, the
quantum random number generator in (Sunada et al.,
2011) uses a semiconductor ring laser that is driven from
a monostable to a bistable state. The amplified spon-
taneous emission noise in the counter-propagating laser
modes that appears during switching defines the final
stable state from the two possible options and gives a
random macroscopic bit that has a quantum origin.
Competition between optical modes is also the source
of randomness in the generator proposal of (Shenoy et al.,
2013), in which spontaneously emitted photons in two
possible competing modes are amplified in a laser setup
so that there is a macroscopic winning mode that ampli-
fies the quantum uncertainty at the single photon level.
VIII. NON-OPTICAL QUANTUM RANDOM NUMBER
GENERATORS
While quantum light offers a simple source of quantum
randomness, there have also been proposals for quantum
random number generators based on other physical sys-
tems.
For historical reasons, we have already discussed in
their own section the quantum random number genera-
tors based on the random behaviour of radioactive de-
cay (Section V). They were the first quantum random
number generators well before the explosion of quantum
information theory and remain in use. While they are
based on the detection of particles, they are in many as-
pects equivalent to the optical schemes based on photon
counting, time of arrival and position (in fact, in the case
of γ radiation we can say we have an optical system, just
with photons of a very high frequency).
A second family of non-optical random number gener-
ators with a quantum contribution is the group of elec-
tronic RNGs we have covered in Section VI. In general,
their source of randomness is not so clearly defined as in
the rest of quantum random number generators described
in this paper, but noise generation with Zener diodes,
when implemented properly, can be taken to an almost
purely quantum regime (Stipcˇevic´, 2004) and electronic
shot noise is the source of randomness in certain com-
mercial quantum random number generator of ComScire
(ComScire, 2014).
In a reverse-biased Zener diode with a low breakdown
voltage, the dominant source for the current that appears
is the completely quantum tunnel effect (Pierret, 1996).
The p-n junction of the diode presents a potential energy
barrier that is thin enough to allow random quantum
tunneling of some of the electrons from the valence band
of the p-side to the conduction band of the n-side of the
junction. This creates a random reverse current that is
the basis for many electronic noise physical random num-
ber generators.
Similarly, the tunnel effect at the p-n junctions in MOS
transistors creates a leakage current formed by the elec-
trons that tunnel through the insulating layer under the
gate. This tunneling introduces a varying current that
suffers from shot noise due to the discrete nature of the
electrons. These changes can be converted into a vari-
able jitter in ring oscillators and processed to produce
random numbers (ComScire, 2014). The origin of the
noise is similar to that of the optical random number
generators discussed in Section VII.F, but replacing dis-
crete elements of light (photons) with discrete elements
of current (electrons).
The shot noise in p-n junctions of different semiconduc-
tor devices is a usual source of randomness in home-made
electronic random number generators. An example is the
random number generator based on reversed-biased p-n
junctions in transistors of (Platt and Logue, 2015).
Quantum tunneling is the basic principle behind these
and many additional non-optical random number gener-
ators. Apart from shot noise in p-n junctions, tunneling
explains, among others, cold emission of electrons from
metallic surfaces or alpha decay (Razavy, 2014). From
that point of view, we can say a QRNG based on ra-
dioactive alpha decay is also based on tunneling. Sim-
ilarly, the random number generator that amplifies the
electrons coming from nano-size emitters under an elec-
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tric field in (Vartsky et al., 2011) is a QRNG based on
tunneling.
Other quantum random number generators measure
the state of atomic quantum systems, like trapped ions.
QRNGs based on measurements on trapped ions, while
slower than their optical counterparts, have an interest-
ing application to device independent quantum random
number generation (Pironio et al., 2010) and other cer-
tified generators that are based on experimental tests of
quantum mechanics (Um et al., 2013). Trapped ions sys-
tems are more complex to implement than most optical
measurement setups, but they offer almost perfect detec-
tion efficiencies, which is paramount in certification. Due
to the special interest of this generation method, we give
a more detailed description in Section IX.B.
There are also more exotic proposals related to the
certification of the produced random bits, like generat-
ing random numbers with Majorana fermions (Deng and
Duan, 2013). A Majorana fermion is a particle predicted
in 1937 (Majorana, 1937) for which there is convincing
experimental support (Nadj-Perge et al., 2014) and which
would have desirable properties against noise and imper-
fections in certain implementations of quantum informa-
tion protocols.
Another curious proposal is the QRNG of (Katsopri-
nakis et al., 2008) that measures the quantum fluctua-
tions of the collective spin of an alkali-metal vapor. Spin
noise is a random magnetic moment that appears when
we have a collection of atoms, even in the absence of
an external magnetic field, and is proportional to the
number of involved atoms. Spin noise allows to probe
the properties of the system efficiently with experiments
imitating magnetic resonance methods and its measure-
ment has applications, among others, to spectroscopy in
semiconductors (Hu¨bner et al., 2014; Katsoprinakis et al.,
2007).
Spin noise is an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck stochastic process
that appears from the quantum uncertainty of the spin
degrees of freedom combined with measurement-induced
noise coming from atomic collisions. The spin state can
be probed optically due to optical selection rules that
permit to map the varying spin polarization onto the
intensity of a probe light beam. With a proper setup,
the fluctuations in the optical power due to spin noise
dominate over the electronic noise and the photon shot
noise and the optical power gives a precise measurement
of the global magnetic field.
The QRNG in (Katsoprinakis et al., 2008) measures
the spin noise by analizing the polarization of a probe
beam after traversing an alkali-metal vapor under a mag-
netic field. Spin noise produces a random change in the
polarization that can be monitored by measuring the am-
plitude in the horizontal and vertical component of the
light after a polarizing beam splitter. Comparing the
level in one branch to a threshold that includes the pres-
ence of background noise, we can generate a random bi-
nary sequence assigning a 0 or a 1 depending on whether
we stay below the threshold or not.
The generation rate reaches the kbps range and is lim-
ited by the relaxation time of the system. In this case,
it is desirable that the coherence of the system is short-
lived so that a new random state can be created as fast
as possible. Samples below the relaxation time would be
correlated. Nevertheless, there are systems with lower re-
laxation times, particularly solid state systems like GaAs
structures, which could allow dephasing rates in the order
of 1 GHz (Oestreich et al., 2005; Stich et al., 2007).
IX. RANDOM NUMBERS CERTIFIED BY QUANTUM
MECHANICS
Cryptographic random number generators face a prob-
lem of trust. Users must ultimately trust the algorithm
of a pseudorandom number generator or the device that
implements a true random number generation method.
The alternative, which is devising a random number gen-
eration from scratch, is highly undesirable. The crypto-
graphic maxim “Don’t roll your own crypto” sums up
the collected experience of the security community and
warns against non-tested systems. Trusted algorithms
and devices have resisted years of cryptoanalysis and at-
tempted attacks and public inspection vouches for their
robustness.
Unfortunately, this means that, at some point, users
must trust the device or the algorithm they are given.
The question, which might seem academic or for the
paranoid-minded, is not trivial. The events in the last
years have shown RNGs are a tempting target for hid-
den attacks. For instance, the pseudo-random number
generation algorithm DUAL EC DBRG, which was pro-
posed as a NIST standard (Barker and Kelsey, 2007),
allows backdoors that permit an attacker to recover the
whole random sequence with minimal information (Bern-
stein et al., 2015; Checkoway et al., 2014; Hales, 2014;
Shumow and Ferguson, 2007), which has had practical
consequences in the Juniper network attack (CVE7755,
2015). At the hardware level, there are demonstrations
of how a rogue manufacturer or any attacker with access
to the device can insert very hard to detect errors in real
world RNGs by introducing dopants in certain parts of
the circuit (Becker et al., 2014). This is an example of the
more general threat of hardware trojans, which are differ-
ent kinds of malicious modifications that are inserted at
the hardware level (Tehranipoor and Koushanfar, 2010).
For physical random number generators there is also
the possibility of spontaneous failure. If a component
from the device stops working or degrades, the quality
of the output bits might suffer. Subtle hardware failures
can be hard to notice, especially if the device still pro-
duces an output. For that reason, security recommenda-
tions like the AIS 31 standard of the German Bundesamt
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fu¨r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (Killmann and
Schindler, 2011) or the draft of NIST SP 800-90B (Turan
et al., 2016) ask for some kind of self testing inside true
random number generators. A subsystem should moni-
tor the state of the device at all times (Bucci and Luzzi,
2005; Fischer, 2012).
In this Section, we review three quantum-inspired ways
of working with untrusted devices. The first method is
using some properties associated to quantum phenomena
to observe the quality of the produced bits. The sec-
ond subsection gathers the proposals collectively known
as device independent quantum random number genera-
tors, which are based on the clever realization that there
are quantum correlations that guarantee certain statisti-
cal independence unless some trusted physical principles,
like causality, are wrong. The third part describes quan-
tumness certification methods that are inspired by device
independent generators, but use less stringent experimen-
tal tests of different aspects of the quantum theory and
provide a limited certification under more relaxed secu-
rity assumptions.
A. Self-testing in quantum random number generators
Most quantum random number generators do not fully
characterize their source of randomness. For instance,
while a photon at a beam splitter (Figure 6) should
produce perfectly random bits, there can be problems
with detector efficiency, unbalances in the splitting pro-
cess, imperfections in the source and many unsuspected
sources of correlation. For that reason, there have ap-
peared different methods to check the quality of the ran-
dom numbers produced in physical random number gen-
erators. This is not exclusive to quantum random num-
ber generators. In classical physical random number gen-
erators there are different ways to check the output to de-
tect failures, like including hardware versions of the NIST
and Diehard randomness tests we describe in Section XII
(Hotoleanu et al., 2010; Santoro et al., 2009a,b; Suresh
et al., 2013; Vaskova et al., 2010, 2011; Yang et al., 2015).
Here, we discuss only the self-testing approaches that are
directly related to the quantum properties of the random
number generator.
There are also self-testing methods that can work both
with classical noise and quantum sources of entropy. The
self-testing circuit described in (Saito et al., 2010) com-
pares the time of arrival of random pulses coming either
from thermal noise or from the detection of radioactive
decay with a Geiger counter (Section V) and tests the re-
sulting distribution against the expected Poisson time of
arrival. Only the random numbers passing the tests are
put forward to the output, filtering out obvious failures.
While there is still a risk from a malicious attacker that
modifies the output to produce predictable sequences
that will pass the tests, these self-checking systems can
detect spontaneous failures and less sophisticated attacks
and they are a good addition to security. Tests can serve
as a canary to detect operation errors and alert that
something is wrong.
Testing must be done with due care. Accurate entropy
estimation is a hard problem and a system that evaluates
the available entropy with a poor implementation can be
vulnerable to attacks (Dodis et al., 2013).
The first mention to self-testing in a quantum setting
was presented in the optical QRNG of (Fiorentino et al.,
2007) that is designed to work with either a single photon
in a polarization superposition
|ψ〉 = |H〉+ |V 〉√
2
(32)
or with an entangled state
|ψ〉 = |H〉1 |V 〉2 + |V 〉1 |H〉2√
2
. (33)
The quantum random number generator works on the
principles of path branching discussed in Section VII.B.
The device includes a testing phase in which it per-
forms full tomography of the input state (James et al.,
2001) from a set of measurements in order to determine
the 2×2 matrix that describes the photonic two level sys-
tem for a single photon or the effective two-dimensional
Hilbert space of interest in the case of the photon pair.
From the measurement results, the generator estimates
the minimum possible min-entropy H˜∞(ρˆ) for the joint
state of the user and an eavesdropper, ρˆ, for the worst
case over all the possible decompositions. Then, the raw
bits are fed to a randomness extractor (Barak et al., 2003)
that, for the estimated bound on the available entropy,
produces a shorter unbiased random string.
This method offers protection against an adversary
that can control the quantum state from which we ob-
tain the entropy as long as we can take repeated mea-
surements on the same state. In order to perform state
tomography correctly, we need to assume the measured
state is the preserved throughout the process. This can
be interesting when the attacker can only alter the pho-
ton source or when there is a physical problem with the
generator. While this kind of self-testing offers a limited
protection against advanced attackers, it is an effective
way to detect accidental errors in the device.
Tomography offers a reasonable entropy estimation in
models where we assume honest errors in implementa-
tion or failures during operation instead of a collection
of components from untrusted colluding manufactures.
Such a model is put forward in the self-testing QRNG
of (Lunghi et al., 2015) where randomness from a quan-
tum origin is separated from technical noise using the
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dimension witness of (Bowles et al., 2014) defined as
W =
∣∣∣∣∣ p (1 | 0, 0)− p (1 | 1, 0) p (1 | 2, 0)− p (1 | 3, 0)p (1 | 0, 1)− p (1 | 1, 1) p (1 | 2, 1)− p (1 | 3, 1)
∣∣∣∣∣
(34)
where p (b | x, y) gives the conditional probability of find-
ing an outcome b (from ±1) for a state prepared in one
out of four x = 0, 1, 2, 3 possibilities in a measurement
setting y that can be 0 or 1. In the discussed generator,
the four states correspond to the circular right and left
polarizations or the diagonal and antidiagonal polariza-
tions of the second photon from an entangled pair, which
is measured in the diagonal or the circular polarization
basis. The first photon acts as a herald.
W gives an idea of “how quantum” is the combina-
tion of preparation and measurement. AnyW > 0 shows
that some measurements are incompatible and there is
some quantum randomness that allows to give a bound
on the guessing probability. The result can be used to
decide the level of compression in a randomness extrac-
tor. For smaller values ofW (a more classical behaviour)
the raw input bits produce a smaller number of clean
random bits. The experimental test of this method in
(Lunghi et al., 2015) gave a final bit rate around tens of
bits per second and showed a correct response to envi-
ronmental changes, like the alignment problems resulting
from turning off the air conditioning in the lab.
A similar approach to self-testing with a Faraday-
Michelson quantum key distribution system (Mo et al.,
2005) is given in (Song et al., 2015).
An alternative is to take advantage of the uncertainty
principle to ensure any adversary has a limited amount of
information. As in the previous methods, our goal is not
only to generate random bits, but to be sure they are pri-
vate (no external attacker can learn our sequence). For
instance, if we measure the polarization of the first pho-
ton in the entangled state of Eq. (33) in the horizontal-
vertical basis, we would get perfectly random numbers,
but an adversary that captures the second half would
know the exact sequence we obtain by taking the same
measurement. This can be acceptable in applications like
simulation, but in cryptography we need to avoid any
information leakage. The certification method in (Val-
lone et al., 2014) is designed to ensure privacy without
full tomography by switching between two mutually un-
biased bases (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2002; Durt et al.,
2010). Instead of a full tomographic measurement, two
bases are enough. The conditional min-entropy with re-
spect to an eavesdropper (Section IV) gives a bound to
the amount of randomness we can safely extract from a
measurement (De et al., 2012; Ko¨nig et al., 2009). The
uncertainty principle guarantees there is a limited corre-
lation with the environment for any possible input state
(we can prove a bound on the conditional min-entropy
from our measurement results). This implementation re-
quires a small random seed to choose between the bases.
The original randomness in the seed is expanded after
the measurements into a reliable private bit string. The
seed needs to be uniform and cannot be taken from the
same weak randomness source as the rest of the bits (see
Section X for a more detailed description of randomness
extraction and the role of uniform seeds). The method
was demonstrated with entangled photon pairs gener-
ated from parametric down-conversion and measurement
in the diagonal/antidiagonal and the horizontal/vertical
polarization bases.
We can also follow the methods of precision measure-
ment (Bloom et al., 2014; Maddaloni et al., 2013) and
propose a complete model of the generator where all
the sources of uncertainty are rigorously characterized
and all the experimental imperfections are taken into ac-
count in the most conservative way. The experimental
standards followed in precision measurement have been
put to test in atomic clocks with impressive results and
can be adapted to quantum random number generation.
This characterization based on metrology has been fol-
lowed by (Mitchell et al., 2015) to vouch for the ran-
domness in a phase noise QRNG. The chosen device,
described in (Abella´n et al., 2014), is based in the ran-
dom phase in a laser, as explained in Section VII.G. A
physical model can give a strict bound for the average
min-entropy, which is used to choose a randomness ex-
tractor. The method works with theoretical considera-
tions alone, but also gives room to introduce constraints
based on auxiliary measurements or on the data that has
been generated. This kind of estimation has also be done
in (Haw et al., 2015) for the initial configuration of the
QRNG based on the measurement of vacuum fluctuations
of (Symul et al., 2011) (see Section VII.F).
B. Device independent quantum random number
generators
A second approach to certifying random numbers is
ignoring the details inside the quantum random number
generator and judge the results based only on the out-
put. In particular, we want to prove that the output
must be random or otherwise some physical law must be
broken. This is the basic model behind device indepen-
dent quantum information processing, which started in
the context of quantum key distribution with (Mayers
and Yao, 1998) and (Barrett et al., 2005) with multiple
further developments (Ac´ın et al., 2007; Colbeck, 2007;
Colbeck and Kent, 2011; Magniez et al., 2006).
In the case of random number generation, it tries to
address the worst imaginable case where an adversary has
generated genuinely random numbers, for instance with a
quantum random number generator, and then has hidden
them inside a manipulated device. If we check the output
of that device, the sequence will pass all randomness tests
and we will trust the results. This problem is difficult to
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avoid, but has a quantum solution.
Device independent quantum random number genera-
tors solve the problem of trusting the device with schemes
based on Bell tests. The ideas of Bell violation stem from
the discussion of an apparent discordance of quantum
theory and relativity known as the Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen paradox (Einstein et al., 1935). In an entangled
state, measurement of one of the particles immediately
sets the state of the other particle. This seems to contra-
dict the no-signalling principle than forbids faster than
light communication. John Bell showed that the con-
tradiction could be settled experimentally (Bell, 1964).
The statistics of measurement on space-like separated
entangled particles would be different in a realistic local
world with no interaction faster than light and in a world
where the laws of quantum mechanics hold. Both alter-
natives are incompatible. Aspect’s experiment (Aspect
et al., 1982) showed support for the quantum descrip-
tion. There are, however, experimental loopholes that
could still allow a hidden variable theory that is local or
realistic. A series of ever more sophisticated experiments
is closing alternative explanations and confirm the pre-
dictions of quantum theory (Giustina et al., 2015; Hensen
et al., 2015; Shalm et al., 2015). A detailed description of
Bell inequalities and nonlocality can be found in (Brun-
ner et al., 2014).
In the experimental QRNG of (Pironio et al., 2010)
the chosen version of the Bell’s inequalities is the Clauser-
Horne-Shimony-Holt, CHSH, formulation (Clauser et al.,
1969), which is particularly elegant, simple and intuitive.
We study the correlations in measurements from two de-
vices and define two variables x and y, one for each de-
vice. The variables can take two values, 0 and 1, that cor-
respond to a choice between two binary measurements.
Both measurement devices are identical. The measure-
ment in the x configuration gives a binary output a and
the measurement defined by y gives an outcome b. We
are interested in the correlation function
I =
∑
x,y
(−1)xy[P (a = b | xy)− P (a 6= b | xy))] (35)
where P (a = b | xy) and P (a = b | xy) are the probabil-
ities that a = b or a 6= b when the settings are x and y.
For a realistic local theory we should always find I ≤ 2.
Any value above 2 indicates non-locality.
The function I can be experimentally approximated by
estimating the probabilities after taking a series of mea-
surements. As long as the systems are separated and do
not interact, if the laws of quantum mechanics hold and
the inputs xi and yi at any stage i are generated by inde-
pendent random processes, the estimation of I, I˜, gives,
after some work, a lower bound to the min-entropy of the
outputs. The original derivation of the bound on min-
entropy in (Pironio et al., 2010) had a technical error,
but in (Pironio and Massar, 2013) and (Fehr et al., 2013)
there are restored correct proofs of the main results, as
well as demonstrations of some additional properties of
the protocol, like its composability8 and its fitness to
generate random bits for their use in cryptography.
If the system admits a classical description, I˜ ≤ 2,
the bound is zero and the system could be deterministic.
If the measurements are done on states showing some
entanglement the produced random bits are guaranteed
to have some randomness. The resulting bit sequence
is not necessarily uniformly random, but the bound in
its min-entropy means it can be converted into a random
uniform string with an appropriate randomness extractor
(see Section X).
For quantum devices with spacelike separated parts
with access to independent random sources, there are no
additional constraints on the devices or the input states
as long as I˜ > 2. The only additional requisite is that
the chosen measurement settings xi and yi at each stage
of the protocol have some randomness (are not perfectly
predictable). In that respect, the described generator is
a randomness expansion scheme, much similarly to what
happens in Ekert’s proposal for quantum key distribu-
tion (Ekert, 1991; Vazirani and Vidick, 2014). Starting
from a random seed, the protocol gives a longer output
random string whose randomness is certified by quan-
tum mechanics. The protocol in (Pironio et al., 2010) is
quadratic: in order to produce n certified random bits it
consumes a previously existing random sequence of the
order of
√
n bits. The protocol of (Vazirani and Vidick,
2011) creates strings with n random bits certified to be
secure against quantum adversaries starting from a seed
of a length of the order of log32 n bits, offering an expo-
nential expansion.
Physically, the QRNG in (Pironio et al., 2010) was
implemented with trapped ion qubits (Olmschenk et al.,
2007) in order to close the detection loophole. Ion sys-
tems result in slower generation when compared to op-
tical implementations, but offer almost perfect detection
efficiency. Each atom first emits a photon with which it is
entangled and then interference between the photons en-
tangles the ions. This is a probabilistic heralded process.
Experimental violation of Bell’s inequality is a delicate
task and the generation process was excruciatingly slow,
giving only 42 certified random bits with a 99% confi-
dence level9 after around a month of continuous running.
8 In cryptography, proofs of security are limited to the particular
conditions of the protocol and might fail when the results are put
forward to a second cryptographic protocol. Putting together
the information leaked from the first and the second protocol
can compromise the data in a way neither protocol alone does.
We say a protocol is composable if we can prove its output can
be safely used as the input of another protocol, maybe under
some restrictions. A composable protocol can be used as a part
of a larger system and is still secure (Barak et al., 2004; Canetti,
2001).
9 The statistical nature of the device independent generation pro-
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Later proposals relax some of the requisites to al-
low for optical implementations and faster generation
rates. Most optical detectors have a low efficiency, but
transition-edge-sensor detectors (Lita et al., 2008) have
been shown to offer a high enough efficiency to close the
detection loophole in some modified versions of Bell’s in-
equality (Giustina et al., 2013) and have been used to
generate certified quantum random numbers at a rate of
about half a bit per second (Christensen et al., 2013).
The QRNG of (Can˜as et al., 2014) takes an alterna-
tive model that permits lower detection efficiencies with a
semi-device-independent approach (Paw lowski and Brun-
ner, 2011) where we still do not trust the device but sup-
pose we work with a quantum system with a bounded
dimension. The experiment encodes the quantum data
in the linear transverse momentum of single photons us-
ing spatial light modulators. While in the mentioned
demonstration there are only two paths available, includ-
ing spatial light modulators permits to control the spa-
tial profile of single photons to encode higher dimensional
quantum states. This optical system reaches bit rates of
0.28 certified bits per second.
Other optical implementations focus on optimizing de-
vice independent random bit generation in experiments
with entangled photon pairs. This is the approach in
(Ma´ttar et al., 2015) and (Vivoli et al., 2015) and in the
NIST randomness beacon (NIST, 2011).
The ideas of device independent quantum random
number generators can be extended to an even more
general model where quantum mechanics needs not to
be true, following the example of the device indepen-
dent quantum key distribution protocols (Barrett et al.,
2012, 2005) that only require the no-signalling principle
to hold. The no-signalling principle forbids the trans-
mission of information faster than the speed of light. A
faster than light communication device would allow send-
ing messages to the past and produces a conflict with
causality (Tolman, 1917), as exemplified by the grandfa-
ther paradox10. The no-signalling principle is subtle. In
entangled states, while there is non-locality and there are
correlations that seem to travel faster than the speed of
light, it is in fact impossible to use them to send infor-
mation (Bussey, 1982; Dieks, 1982; Jordan, 1983).
In the device independent quantum random number
generators of (Pironio et al., 2010) and (Vazirani and
cess can only certify a violation of Bell’s inequality with a certain
confidence level. We can ask for more certainty by taking more
measurements (and thus reducing the generation speed).
10 In the grandfather paradox, a time traveller, somewhat cruelly,
decides to prevent the journey by killing his grandfather (Nahin,
1999). While it is still open whether General Relativity allows
time travel, we can consider causality a fundamental principle.
Even if it is not completely impossible, the no-signalling restric-
tion is equivalent to asking an attacker for the highly nontrivial
feat of time travel.
Vidick, 2011) the bounds are also given for the non-
signalling restriction. The exact bound on the condi-
tional min-entropy changes, but the general results hold.
In this new model, the protocols still work as randomness
amplification schemes that need a uniform random seed.
All the commented device independent random num-
ber generators, quantum and non-signalling alike, are, in
fact, implementations of protocols that use the results
from physical experiments to expand randomness. They
start from a small random seed and produce a longer bit
sequence guaranteed to be random. We give a more de-
tailed description of this quantum randomness expansion
in Section XI.
C. Other forms of quantum certification
Instead of testing locality with Bell inequalities, we can
try to design certified quantum random number genera-
tors based on other experimental tests of the basic fea-
tures of quantum theory. The Kochen-Specker theorem
shows that there are states for which no non-contextual
hidden variable model can reproduce the predictions of
quantum mechanics (Kochen and Specker, 1967). Con-
textuality in quantum mechanics is related to the ex-
istence of non-commutable observables where the order
of measurement is important and there is no predefined
model that can give the outcomes of two successive in-
compatible measurements. Contextuality implies nonlo-
cality (Einstein, 1948).
Quantum random number generators based on test of
contextuality are designed to make sure we are access-
ing quantum randomness and not classical noise. In this
model, we still work with untrusted devices but in a less
adversarial setting. We assume the manufacturer of the
random number generator is not actively trying to fool
us, but we admit the device can be faulty or poorly de-
signed. A test of contextuality shows whether we are
truly reading bits from a quantum source or not. One of
the advantages of quantum random number generators is
that we can clearly trace the origin of our random bits to
a defined quantum phenomenon. These certified genera-
tors can help to detect the randomness due to classical
noise, imperfections or failures in the device and take
only the randomness from quantum origin. Contextu-
ality tests can work without spacelike separation of the
devices. This is both the merit and the disadvantage of
the method. These tests do not required complex non-
local entangled states, but we cannot count on causality
to guarantee the bits must be random. Unlike in device
independent protocols, a rogue manufacturer can feed us
pregenerated bits without being detected.
The quantum random number generators of (Deng
et al., 2013) and (Um et al., 2013) produce certified ran-
dom bits based on contextuality tests through the viola-
tion of the Klyachko-Can-Binicioglu-Shumovsky, KCBS,
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inequality (Klyachko et al., 2008), which doesn’t require
entangled states. The basic principle follows the model of
(Pironio et al., 2010). A violation of the KCBS inequal-
ity guarantees a lower bound in the entropy of the output
string, which can then be fed to a randomness extractor.
The results serve as a certificate of quantumness, with a
minimum amount of randomness that can be safely said
to be of quantum origin.
The physical implementation can be optical (Deng
et al., 2013), with a qutrit11 encoded in a photon in a
superposition of three possible paths, or use a three-level
trapped ion (Um et al., 2013), which permits to close the
detection efficiency loophole and avoids the problems of
obtaining a single photon on demand. In the ion system,
the random bits come from registering or not fluorescence
during a measurement that takes around 10 ms. In both
cases, under the tested experimental conditions, the de-
vices could only provide a net gain in randomness, i.e.
generate more random bits than they consumed, when
using non-uniform measurement settings.
Along the same lines, there are also theoretical pro-
posals for random number generators based on contextu-
ality tests in settings similar to the previous experiment
(Abbott et al., 2012) and with entangled states (Abbott
et al., 2014) that highlight the relationship of randomness
and incomputability (Calude and Svozil, 2008).
X. POSTPROCESSING
Standard random number generators are designed to
produce a random uniform string. The postprocessing
stage takes care of converting the raw bit sequence into
a good quality output as close as possible to a uniform
bit distribution. Postprocessing can include tasks like
buffering to accumulate samples before generating the
output strings or health tests that check the generator is
working properly (Schindler and Killmann, 2003). For in-
stance, the commercial quantum random number gener-
ator based on path branching Quantis includes hardware
to check for inconsistencies following the AIS31 standard
(ID Quantique, 2014).
Apart from these tasks, which vary from generator to
generator, the main purpose of postprocessing is random-
ness extraction. Most physical RNGs include one form
or another of randomness extraction to correct for bi-
ases and correlations that appear due to imperfections in
the measurement and generation devices even for good
randomness sources with a high entropy.
A high entropy is not enough to guarantee the gener-
ated random sequence is fit for any purpose. While there
11 The Kochen-Specker theorem works for any quantum system of
dimension d ≥ 3.
are methods that can fix weak sources for their use in ran-
domized algorithms (Zuckerman, 1996), where random-
ness brings efficiency, not all protocols can work with im-
perfect randomness. In particular, many cryptographic
protocols for tasks like bit commitment, encryption, zero
knowledge or secret sharing are not secure unless they
use an almost uniform random sequence (Dodis et al.,
2004).
Some hardware random number generators mix dif-
ferent randomness sources by taking the logical XOR of
their bits or feed the strings to a cryptographic hash func-
tion (Networking Working Group, 2005). Von Neumann
proposed a simple debiasing method in which, for every
pair of generated bits, we discard the results 00 and 11
and assign a 0 to 01 and a 1 to 10 (von Neumann, 1951).
If we have a systematic bias this method will remove it
at the cost of throwing away at least half of our bits and
reducing our bit rate at least by one fourth (discarding
more bits the more biased our original sequence was).
The basic method can be refined to improve its efficiency
(Elias, 1972; Peres, 1992).
Before going on describing randomness extraction in
more detail, it is important to define what is considered
as an “acceptably” uniform output. A useful concept is
that of distance between distributions. For two proba-
bility distributions X and Y defined in the same support
(they can take the same values in a finite alphabet A),
we can define a statistical distance
d(X,Y ) = max
a∈A
|PX(a)− PY (a)|. (36)
This metric gives the maximum difference in the proba-
bility of getting a particular result in the compared dis-
tributions. We say two distributions X and Y are ǫ-close
if
d(X,Y ) ≤ ǫ. (37)
In randomness extraction the goal is to produce an
output sequence which is as close to uniform as possible.
That usually means taking the n bits of the raw output
and transforming them into strings of m bits with a dis-
tribution which is ǫ-close to Um (a distribution uniform
in {0, 1}m) for a small ǫ that depends on our requisites.
Ideally, we would like extractors that give as many out-
put bits as possible with the smallest use of additional
resources like computation time or additional random-
ness. In that respect, the randomness measures we have
discussed in Section IV serve as a design guide. In par-
ticular, the min-entropy of the distribution of the raw
sequence gives a limit on how many bits we can extract.
If we take n-bit strings from the raw sequence with a dis-
tribution X of min-entropy H∞(X) = k, we can extract
at most k random bits that are close to uniform, irrespec-
tive of the original length. A random process is called an
(n, k)-source if it produces n bits with a distribution X
of min-entropy H∞(X) ≥ k.
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In the following section we will discuss different meth-
ods to generate bit sequences as close to uniform as de-
sired for rates close to the min-entropy limit and the ad-
vantages and limitations of different randomness extrac-
tion approaches.
A. Randomness extractors
Randomness extractors are functions that convert a
weak source of entropy into a uniform bit generator.
They were originally introduced in the study of random-
ized algorithms, but have become a basic tool in many
areas of theoretical computer science. Randomness ex-
tractors and related concepts like dispersers, condensers
and expander graphs have multiple applications and ap-
pear in the fields of pseudorandom number generators,
error-correcting codes, samplers, expander graphs and
hardness amplifiers, among others (Vadhan, 2007).
In this Section, we discuss only the few concepts about
extractors most relevant to QRNGs and refer the inter-
ested reader to the extensive literature on the subject,
ranging from introductory tutorials (Shaltiel, 2011) to
detailed surveys (Nisan, 1996; Nisan and Ta-Shma, 1999;
Shaltiel, 2002). There are many available options for ran-
domness extraction and the final choice is usually influ-
enced by the speed and hardware requirements of each
method. Here, we just comment on some particularly
interesting extractors.
In order to have an efficient method and preserve as
many bits as necessary, we need to have a good estima-
tion of our available entropy and then choose an adequate
randomness extractor (Ma et al., 2013b). Otherwise, the
output of the extraction function will not have the de-
sired properties.
In the following, we assume we have a well-
characterized randomness source. The relevant entropy
measures were discussed in Section IV. The raw sequence
is assumed to have a known min-entropy or, in some
cases, at least some known properties such as indepen-
dence between bits or that it comes from a Markov pro-
cess.
In the next Sections, we also assume by default that
we want an (n,m, k, ǫ)-extractor: a function that convert
n bits of an (n, k)-source into m output bits with a dis-
tribution that is ǫ-close to uniform, with m as close to k
as possible.
1. Deterministic extractors
Deterministic extractors are functions
Ext : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m (38)
that take input strings of n bits {0, 1}n into m output
bits. They are particularly attractive as they are deter-
ministic algorithms that only need an input sequence to
work. However, they have some limitations that prevent
their use with certain randomness sources.
As in all extractors, we can only produce an output
close to uniform if the input sequence already has enough
intrinsic entropy. If the input sequence is an (n, k)-
source, a necessary condition for the output sequence to
be close to uniform is that m ≥ k. Unfortunately, the
necessary condition is not sufficient and we can only find
deterministic extractors for certain limited input distri-
butions.
An elementary argument shows the impossibility of
general deterministic extractors. Imagine a function from
{0, 1}n to {0, 1}. We can divide all possible inputs into
one set of all the input n-bit strings that give a 0,
Ext−1(0), and another set that is taken to 1, Ext−1(1),
and at least one of them has a size 2n−1 or larger. An
input that is a uniform distribution in the larger set has
at least min-entropy n− 1 but produces always the same
output showing there is no one-size-fits-all extractor valid
for any input distribution (Chor and Goldreich, 1988).
There are, however, valid extractors for input distribu-
tions belonging to certain families of processes that de-
scribe reasonable sources. Among others, there are prac-
tical deterministic extractors for samplable distributions
(Trevisan and Vadhan, 2000), for bit-fixing sources where
an adversary can set part of the bits (Gabizon et al.,
2006; Kamp and Zuckerman, 2007) and generalizations
for affine sources (Bourgain, 2007; Gabizon and Raz,
2005) or sources with an output that is distributed uni-
formly over an unknown algebraic variety (Dvir, 2012).
Variable length deterministic extractors form another
group of interesting deterministic extractors which devi-
ate slightly from the description of Equation (38). They
are exemplified in the von Neumann algorithm: a deter-
ministic method that works for an unknown distribution
and gives an output of a length that is not known before
the extraction. In the von Neumann randomness extrac-
tor described at the beginning of this section the only
requisite is that each input bit is independent from the
previous and following bits. Refined versions of von Neu-
mann’s method reduce the discarded entropy and give ef-
ficiencies close the information theory limit given by the
Shannon entropy of the source (Elias, 1972; Peres, 1992).
Further modifications give algorithms that produce un-
biased sequences on the more general condition that the
input sequence comes from a Markov chain (Blum, 1986;
Zhou and Bruck, 2012).
The main appeal of the original method is its sim-
plicity. It requires minimal computing power, it can be
implemented with just basic hardware and the distri-
bution at the source needs not to be perfectly known.
However, it has some important limitations. If we have
an external attacker that can alter the bias from bit
to bit, even slightly, the von Neumann extractor no
longer works. In fact, there is no deterministic algorithm
that can give a uniform output for a random variable
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X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) with n bits if the bias of the input
bits can vary so that the probability of finding a 1 for
the nth bit conditioned on the measured string for the
previous bit values s is
δ ≤ PXi (1|x1x2 . . . xn−1 = s) ≤ 1− δ (39)
for a 0 < δ ≤ 12 . This is called a Santha-Vazirani
source and was described as a model for weak random-
ness sources in (Santha and Vazirani, 1986) together with
an impossibility proof for a deterministic extractor.
Despite this limitation, there are deterministic algo-
rithms that permit to use a weak Santha-Vazirani source
to simulate randomized algorithms (Andreev et al., 1999;
Vazirani and Vazirani, 1985b). The requisites for ran-
domization are less stringent than for other applications,
like cryptography, and weak sources that fail to produce
nearly uniform outputs are sometimes valid.
Even if we use a deterministic extractor, a single weak
source is not good enough for many cryptographic proto-
cols. While weak randomness can be used securely with
signature schemes, encryption and other related proto-
cols need a high quality key or they become vulnera-
ble (Austrin et al., 2014; Dodis et al., 2004; Dodis and
Spencer, 2002; McInnes and Pinkas, 1991).
For applications where we need an output close to uni-
form, (Santha and Vazirani, 1986) offer a simple solu-
tion: combining the output of two independent Santha-
Vazirani weak sources we can produce output sequences
that cannot be distinguished by any polynomial-time al-
gorithm from a uniform distribution. As long as we have
access to a physical method that produces some random-
ness, we can generate bit strings that cannot be distin-
guished from a random string with any efficient algo-
rithm. This is just as good as true randomness for the
vast majority of applications of randomness, including
cryptography.
Multiple source extractors follow this model and
take the output of two or more weak sources and process
them to generate a sequence that is close to uniform.
There are many methods that depend on the concrete
input distributions, the number of sources we have and
the desired properties of the output sequence.
A simple extractor valid for two n-bit blocks from
two independent weak sources, both with min-entropy
at least n/2, is taking the GF (2) inner product of the n-
bit blocks, which reduces to computing the parity of the
bitwise AND of the two sequences (Chor and Goldreich,
1988; Vazirani, 1987a,b).
Other representative methods to combine different ran-
domness sources can be found in (Barak et al., 2006;
Bourgain, 2005; Dodis et al., 2004; Rao, 2009; Raz, 2005;
Shaltiel, 2008).
The idea of combining sources is also behind the second
main group of randomness extractors, seeded extractors.
We can consider them a special case of multiple source
extractors with one weak source and a perfectly uniform
source that only produces a small amount of bits.
2. Seeded extractors
As we have seen, for many raw bit distributions, we
can only achieve an output close to uniform with the help
of some additional randomness. In seeded extractors we
have a function
Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m (40)
that takes as its input n bits from the raw sequence and a
uniform random seed of d bits to produce m output bits.
We assume d is much smaller that m. With the addition
of the seed, which plays a role similar to the seed in
pseudorandom number generators, we can guarantee that
there exist extractors that produce an almost uniform
output close to the maximum possible length. We call a
(k, ǫ) extractor to a function that, for any input k source
(a raw sequence of, at least, min-entropy k), produces an
output sequence that is ǫ close to uniform. The seed acts
as a catalyst that permits to find general methods that
will always work.
Seeded randomness extractors were first defined in
(Nisan and Zuckerman, 1996) in the context of random-
ized algorithms. Using the probabilistic method (Alon
and Spencer, 2016), (Radhakrishnan and Ta-Shma, 2000)
showed there always exist extractors with an output that
contains almost all of the available hidden entropy in an
input raw sequence coming from any k-source. For input
blocks of n bits from a k-source, we can build extrac-
tors with an output of a size m ≈ k + d that is ǫ-close
to uniform using only a seed of a length d of the order
of log2(n). There are different explicit constructions for
these seeded extractors, like the ones in (Lu et al., 2003;
Ta-Shma, 1996).
The need for a uniform seed seems a contradiction:
we require the resource we are trying to produce. How-
ever, the requisites on the seed are less restrictive than it
seems. In many explicit extractors the seed has a length
logarithmic in the size of the input string. For a small
enough d, we can even replace the requisite of random-
ness by an exhaustive enumeration of all the 2d possi-
ble sequences. In randomized algorithms, enumeration
followed by majority voting permits to simulate a good
uniform source (Goldreich and Wigderson, 2002). How-
ever, this approach is clearly not valid for cryptography,
where we need unpredictability.
In quantum random number generators, seeded extrac-
tors provide protection against external attackers. There
are constructions for which there exist proofs of security
against quantum attackers of different power (Ben-Aroya
and Ta-Shma, 2012).
A first notable result is the Trevisan extractor (Tre-
visan, 2001), an explicit construction which has some
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nice properties like its resistance against quantum ad-
versaries (De et al., 2012; De and Vidick, 2010; Ta-Shma,
2011) and the way it preserves the randomness of its seed
(Mauerer et al., 2012). The Trevisan extractor is built
on the Nisan-Widgerson pseudorandom number genera-
tor (Nisan and Wigderson, 1994). It can be seen as a ran-
dom function whose truth table is given by the bits from
the weak source. The random function expands the d bits
of a uniform random seed, both in the PRNG and the ex-
tractor sense. Different variations of the Trevisan extrac-
tor have been implemented for their use with quantum
random number generators and in quantum key distribu-
tion (Ma et al., 2013b; Mauerer et al., 2012). Their main
advantage is that the size of the random uniform seed
is only poly-logarithmic in the size of the input blocks.
However, practical implementations can slow down the
bit generation process due to the involved calculations
required during the extraction.
A second general method of particular interest is two-
universal hashing. The Leftover Hash Lemma (H˚astad
et al., 1999; Impagliazzo et al., 1989) shows that the
output of a two-universal hash function with an input
with high enough entropy is almost uniformly random.
Two-universal hash functions, such as the families in-
troduced in (Carter and Wegman, 1979; Wegman and
Carter, 1981), can extract the randomness in a weak
source in a secure way in the presence of an eavesdropper.
If we have a good estimation or a conservative bound on
the correlation of our weak random source with the eaves-
dropper, using the conditional entropies described in Sec-
tion IV, it is possible to use a generalization of the Left-
over Hash Lemma with side information (Tomamichel
et al., 2011). In the most general case, the side informa-
tion can also be quantum. In a quantum random number
generator with technical noise, we can assume that all the
randomness that comes from imperfections or otherwise
does not adjust to our model of the quantum system
that produces the raw bits is due to an eavesdropper.
In those conditions it is still possible to design a seeded
extractor that gives an almost uniform output that is in-
dependent from external systems (Ko¨nig and Renner ,
2011; Ko¨nig and Terhal, 2008). These methods are also
applied in privacy amplification in Quantum Key Distri-
bution (Bennett et al., 1995, 1988; Ko¨nig et al., 2005;
Renner and Ko¨nig, 2005).
Randomness extraction with two-universal or, more
generally, l-universal hashing forces us to use a relatively
long seed, comparable to the size of the block n, but it
can be recycled. A randomly chosen public uniform seed
can be reused and permits a secure seeded extractor in
the presence of an imperfect randomness source under
partial influence of an attacker (Barak et al., 2003; Sko-
rski, 2015).
When compared to implementations of the Trevisan
extractor, this method offers a fast extractor function
that takes less computational resources at the cost of
a larger seed (Ma et al., 2013b). Some implementa-
tions, like hashing with Toeplitz random binary matrices
(Krawczyk, 1994; Mansour et al., 1990), are particularly
efficient. We can define one such extractor where the
seed is used as a rectangular matrix that is multiplied
to n-vectors from the source to produce an output of
almost independent bits (Frauchiger et al., 2013). This
approach is used in some commercial devices which in-
clude the extraction function as a precomputed random
matrix that acts as the seed and is distributed coded
into the device (Troyer and Renner, 2012). While ensur-
ing the seed is uniformly random to a high degree is a
painstaking task, it only needs to be done once. Long un-
sophisticated methods, like repeatedly taking the XOR
of multiple independent generators, are acceptable.
XI. QUANTUM RANDOMNESS EXTRACTORS:
RANDOMNESS EXPANSION AND RANDOMNESS
AMPLIFICATION
Quantum mechanics does not only offer new sources
of entropy for random number generators, but also new
protocols related to randomness extraction. We will con-
sider physical randomness extractors which use untrusted
ancillary systems either to expand the random output of
a uniform source or to turn a weak randomness source
into strong one (Chung et al., 2014).
There are two interesting families of protocols: quan-
tum randomness expansion and quantum randomness
amplification. In quantum randomness expansion, we
start from small random seed and, with the help of a
quantum protocol, we produce a longer bit sequence with
strong guarantees of randomness. In randomness amplifi-
cation we take a weak source, either classical or quantum,
and use a quantum system to amplify the randomness in
the weak source and give an arbitrarily close to uniform
output.
Related to these ideas is also privacy amplification,
where we take a bit string which is partially known to
an adversary and produce a smaller sequence for which
no external attacker can have any statistically significant
information. There are known classical (Bennett et al.,
1995, 1988) and quantum (Deutsch et al., 1996) algo-
rithms for this task, but we can also use methods re-
lated to randomness extraction protocols that can guar-
antee the output is uncorrelated to any causally preced-
ing events and, therefore, must be private.
In this Section, we given an overview of the main
ideas behind these concepts. The reader can also find
a good review of all the mathematics involved in (Pivo-
luska et al., 2014).
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A. Quantum randomness expansion
Quantum randomness expansion protocols follow the
model of seeded randomness extractors (see Section
X.A.2): assisted by a random seed, we process the bits
from a weak randomness source and give an output that
is as close to uniform as desired.
All the device independent generators discussed in Sec-
tion IX.B are, indeed, implementations of some kind of
randomness expansion protocol working on the weak ran-
domness produced in the nonlocality experiments of dif-
ferent Bell tests. The quantum system serves both as a
weak source of randomness and as a way to guarantee
the privacy of the results. The random seed serves as
a starting point to take the randomness in the quantum
devices into a uniform output.
Randomness expansion protocols can be concatenated
using a limited number of devices (Miller and Shi, 2014).
By repetition of simple protocols with a finite number of
quantum devices, we can increase the size of the output
arbitrarily to produce sequences certified against quan-
tum adversaries (Coudron and Yuen, 2014).
If we relax our requirements and trust part of the sys-
tem, we can also find semi-device independent random-
ness expansion protocols. For instance, for unstrusted
devices but a trusted quantum state with a bounded di-
mension, the protocol in (Bouda et al., 2014) gives an
expansion scheme that does not require entanglement,
which makes it easier to implement in practice. If we
consider an adversary which does not directly control our
device, but can characterize it better than us and has a
complete model of its inner workings, we can also pro-
duce a private output string if we make full use of all the
data taken from a series of Bell tests instead of restricting
to the usual inequalities (Bancal et al., 2014).
A different kind of extractor without Bell tests is
the source-independent seeded extractor in (Cao et al.,
2016), which is designed to work with imperfect quantum
sources and addresses many problems of optical quan-
tum random number generators like losses, multiphoton
pulses or unbalanced beam splitters.
Similarly, there are also quantum-to-classical random-
ness extractors that give a procedure to measure a quan-
tum state from a source that can be correlated to an
eavesdropper so that we maximize the amount of ran-
dom bits we get without giving away information to the
adversary (Berta et al., 2014).
Finally, the concepts of randomness expansion can
also be formulated as a privacy amplification problem
in which we want to extend the length of a private string
while keeping it secret under the usual assumptions of the
device independence scenario with untrusted equipment
(Colbeck and Kent, 2011). The task is possible and ef-
ficient against quantum attackers, but, unlike other pro-
tocols, there are severe limitations if we consider attack-
ers that are only restricted by nonsignalling constraints
(Arnon-Friedman and Ta-Shma, 2012). Anyway, while
considering nonsignalling attackers gives quite general se-
curity results, quantum mechanics seems to be the non-
local theory that best describes the physical world and
a quantum secure protocol can be safely considered as
valid.
B. Quantum randomness amplification
The need for a uniform seed in device-independent pro-
tocols comes from two parts of the procedure. First, in
Bell tests we assume we have uniform random bits to
choose the measurement settings. Second, the generated
bit sequence is only guaranteed to have a lower bound on
min-entropy, but we need to use some seeded randomness
extractor to obtain a uniform output bit string.
Quantum randomness amplification protocols elimi-
nate these previous uniform randomness requisites and
give a way to use a weak source in combination with
quantum devices to produce uniform random bits. In
Section X.A.1 we have seen it is impossible to find a gen-
eral deterministic method to extract randomness from
any limited min-entropy source, even from restricted
weak origins of entropy like Santha-Vazirani sources.
With the help of quantum mechanics, we can solve this
problem and find methods to extract almost uniform ran-
domness in those situations. From a certain point of
view, these protocols are not so much deterministic ran-
domness extractors as multiple source extractors where
we prove how to combine the randomness in the quantum
devices with the randomness of a weak source to produce
a good quality output. While the exact details vary from
protocol to protocol, the quantum part is usually limited
to simple measurements on the different subsystems of
an entangled state. From an experimental point of view,
the hardest requisite to satisfy is making sure the quan-
tum devices are independent, which can be a problem in
protocols that require multiple devices.
A remarkable contribution to quantum randomness
amplification is the randomness amplification protocol of
(Colbeck and Renner, 2012), which shows there are de-
terministic protocols that can amplify the randomness in
Santha-Vazirani sources using ancillary physical systems.
The result rests only on nonlocality and is robust against
attackers that can go beyond quantum mechanics. This
protocol needs a large supply of imperfect randomness.
One natural application would be using quantum ran-
domness amplification only to provide the random seed
for the quantum randomness expansion protocols of the
previous Section and then use the less involved quantum
randomness expansion protocols to generate the final ran-
dom bit stream.
While the original protocol works only for small biases
δ in the definition of the source, see Eq. (39), (Gallego
et al., 2013) give a quantum randomness amplification
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protocol that is valid for arbitrarily weak sources of en-
tropy. Further protocols can take any input weak source
with a bounded nonzero min-entropy (Bouda et al., 2014;
Chung et al., 2014; Plesch and Pivoluska, 2014) and give
practical ways to use Santha-Vazirani sources, requiring
only a limited number of independent devices (Branda˜o
et al., 2016).
There are also interesting ramifications for fundamen-
tal science experiments. Many of the concepts of quan-
tum randomness amplification can be traced back to the
study of randomness in Bell inequalities. These results
are interesting in themselves as they determine which
random number generators can be used in the founda-
tional experiments on nonlocality in Bell tests. In Bell
experiments there is a “free will” loophole: if the set-
tings in the measurement are correlated, the violation of
a Bell inequality cannot be used as a guarantee against
an eavesdropper (Koh et al., 2012). Fortunately, even
in the usual experiments, there is a certain tolerance for
small correlations (Hall, 2010), but general min-entropy
sources are not valid for the selection of the settings in
Bell experiments (Thinh et al., 2013).
XII. RANDOMNESS TESTING
Once we have generated a raw random sequence, we
need to do some quality checks to be sure the device
is working correctly. Unfortunately, there is no way to
check a finite sequence is truly random. Taken to its
most absurd extreme, it is like asking whether a 0 bit is
fundamentally more random than a 1. Apart from the
uncomputable Kolmogorov complexity (Li and Vita´nyi,
2008), there is no way to deduce that a random string
is really random, but there are methods to detect suspi-
cious sequences. While the bit string 1111111111 is just
as likely as 0100110111, if we have a generator that con-
sistently outputs more ones than zeros we have reason to
suspect it is not acting randomly.
The customary approach to randomness testing is us-
ing a series of statistical tests. Knuth covers some of
the most usual ones in (Knuth, 1997). The main suites
available to perform these statistical tests are the NIST
(Rukhin et al., 2010), TestU01 (L’Ecuyer and Simard,
2007) and the DieHard and DieHarder (Brown, 2016;
Marsaglia, 1996) suites. There are also special-purpose
randomness testing batteries, like the one included with
the SPRNG software (Srinivasan et al., 2003), which is
designed to check for problems in parallel implementa-
tions of pseudorandom number generators.
These suites include different tests. In the following
list, we present some of the most relevant tests to give a
feeling of the kind of hidden correlations that can appear.
1. The frequency (monobit) test, which calculates the
proportion between ones and zeroes and how close
that proportion is to 12 , and frequency tests within
a block, similar to the previous one, but testing for
the expected probabilities for the specified block
sizes.
2. The runs test, which checks if the number of runs12
in a bit string corresponds to that in a random
sequence and if the oscillation between zeroes and
ones is too fast or too slow.
3. The spectral test, which tries to detect periodic fea-
tures in the sequence that would indicate a devia-
tion from the assumption of randomness.
4. Maurer’s Universal Statistical test (Maurer, 1992),
which detects whether or not the sequence can be
significantly compressed without loss of informa-
tion.
5. Autocorrelation tests which check the correlation of
the sequence with shifted versions of itself.
Most tests apply statistical analyses similar to the stan-
dard chi-squared test. The result is a p-value that indi-
cates how likely it is for a purely random number gener-
ator to produce the tested sequence. Each test suite has
different threshold values to determine if a given p-value
is compatible with randomness or not.
These tests, while useful to detect faulty generators,
cannot prove a generator produces truly random outputs.
Deterministic pseudorandom number generators like the
Mersenne Twister can pass the tests but are predictable.
Likewise, there can be false positives for correlations and
the tests should be run multiple times for each generator.
Statistically, even a perfect random number generator
would fail a test from time to time.
Testing is also vulnerable to an active attacker that
feeds us pregenerated random sequences that pass the
tests. In Section IX.B we have described some quantum
protocols to solve this issue.
Apart from that, the tests are usually designed with
pseudorandom number generators in mind and do not
include physical models into account. Some correlations
due to implementation-related problems, like afterpulsing
in photon detectors, are not specifically checked.
All these problems notwithstanding, any good quan-
tum random number generator should be able to pass
all the tests in any given suite and using some form of
randomness testing during operation can help to detect
sudden failures or faulty components.
12 A run is defined as an uninterrupted sequence of identical bits
bounded by a bit of the opposite value before and after the same-
bit sequence.
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XIII. DISCUSSION
Quantum random number generation is probably the
most mature quantum technology. We have seen the
multiple ways we can harness the randomness in quan-
tum mechanics to produce random bit strings. Physical
phenomena such as radioactive decay, photon splitting,
noise in Raman amplification, laser phase noise or am-
plified spontaneous emission can serve as reliable entropy
sources.
We have reached a point where optical quantum ran-
dom number generators routinely reach generation rates
in the order of megabits per second with promises of gi-
gabit rates and new generation methods are still being
suggested every year. While there is a race to announce
the highest possible generation rates, in many cases, the
actual implementation is limited by practical hurdles in
the speed of the electronic systems and the postprocess-
ing methods.
Many proposals focus on the generation principle, on
making sure the quantum phenomenon of interest pro-
duces fresh entropy at a fast rate, but do not deal with
making full use of the available bits and give random bit
rates which are only true as an extrapolation. In the re-
search phase, it is perfectly acceptable to leave all the
processing details for later and work on a limited collec-
tion of stored samples, but, at this point of development,
there is a need for better and faster production of the
final, usable random bits.
Commercial devices, by necessity, have these aspects
covered but they still offer bit rates with a gap around
two orders of magnitude with respect to the fastest possi-
ble lab rates. In some applications, like simulation, this is
important, as quantum random number generators have
to compete against fast pseudorandom number genera-
tors that work essentially at the speed of the available
processor.
Concerning the bit rate, there are two relevant issues.
One is the communication bottleneck. External devices
will always need a communication channel with the com-
puter that uses the random bits. The fastest USB pro-
tocols (USB 3.0 and 3.1) and PCI Express components
can reach communication rates in the order of tens of
Gbps that is enough for many generators. Alternatively,
many optical implementations can be adapted or have
been demonstrated to work in integrated silicon setups
that could be included as part of future processors.
Communication at those rates is challenging, but it is
an engineering problem that can be solved with current
technology with the right systems. A second more in-
teresting limitation is randomness extraction. In Section
X, we have described different ways to turn the raw bits
coming from measurement and the first simple condition-
ing into good quality random bits. While some quantum
random number generators are claimed to directly pro-
duce random enough raw sequences, in some applications
like cryptography, less than perfect uniformity can pose
serious problems. In general, quantum random number
generators should include a well-designed postprocessing
phase.
Seeded extractors like Trevisan’s or two-universal
hashing have good security properties against quantum
attackers. That should be the standard that postprocess-
ing methods should aspire to. At the moment, postpro-
cessing is relatively slow when compared to the potential
generation rates of the fastest optical generators. The
most efficient implementations use postprocessing based
on two-universal hashing with binary matrix multiplica-
tion. There is a large open area of research on identi-
fying and constructing new extractors that are resistant
against quantum attacks and can be fast enough to sus-
tain output bit rates in the order of Gbps.
Self-testing is another area for future improvement.
Physical random number generators can fail due to com-
ponent degradation or even external attacks. In Section
IX we have described many possible approaches to qual-
ity control. In particular, device independent protocols
offer reliable random numbers even if we don’t trust our
hardware. Device independent randomness generation
and quantum randomness expansion and amplification
are quite active areas of research and the last years have
seen many interesting results, including new protocols
based on nonlocality that can perform classically impos-
sible tasks, like physically-assisted deterministic random-
ness extraction from weak sources.
Device independent quantum random number genera-
tors are still experimentally challenging and produce bits
at sluggish rates. In Section IX we have also commented
on more relaxed approaches to certification, but this is
likely to be an active area for the next years, both in
technological development research to make better de-
vice independent QRNGs and in the theoretical search
for simpler paths to certification.
At the moment of writing, both pure and applied re-
search have reached an interesting point where there are
new fundamental results and, at the same time, there
appear different quantum random number generators in
the market.
With this review, we hope we have introduced the
reader to the existing technologies and hinted at some
future directions.
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